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i 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to propose an alternative approach in prognostics for 
airborne avionics system in order to enhance maintenance process and aircraft 
availability. The objectives are to analyse the dependency of avionic systems 
for fault propagation behaviour degradation, research and develop methods to 
predict the remaining useful life of avionics Line Replaceable Units (LRU), 
research and develop methods to evaluate and predict the degradation 
performances of avionic systems, and lastly to develop software simulation 
systems to evaluate methods developed.  
One of the many stakeholders in the aircraft lifecycle includes the Maintenance, 
Repair and Overhaul (MRO) industry. The predictable logistics process to some 
degree as an outcome of IVHM gives benefit to the MRO industry.  
In this thesis, a new integrated numerical methodology called ‘System Level 
Airborne Avionic Prognostics’ or SLAAP is developed; looking at a top level 
solution in prognostics. Overall, this research consists of two main elements. 
One is to thoroughly understand and analyse data that could be utilised. 
Secondly, is to apply the developed methodology using the enhanced 
prognostic methodology. 
Readily available fault tree data is used to analyse the dependencies of each 
component within the LRUs, and performance were simulated using the linear 
Markov Model to estimate the time to failure. A hybrid approach prognostics 
model is then integrated with the prognostics measures that include 
environmental factors that contribute to the failure of a system, such as 
temperature. This research attempts to use data that is closest to the data 
available in the maintenance repair and overhaul industry.  
Based on a case study on Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System 
(EGPWS), the prognostics methodology developed showed a sufficiently close 
approximation to the Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) data supplied by the 
ii 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). This validation gives confidence that 
the proposed methodology will achieve its objectives and it should be further 
developed for use in the systems design process. 
Keywords: Aircraft maintenance, Prognostics in avionics, Enhanced ground 
proximity warning system 
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  CHAPTER 1
 INTRODUCTION 1
This chapter presents an overview of the research, defines the research 
problems in the area of study and justifies the significance of carrying out this 
research. Most importantly, this chapter provides the research aim, and also the 
objectives of this thesis. A brief overview of methodology and thesis outline is 
also presented at the end of this chapter. 
1.1 Diagnostics and prognostics 
Commercial airlines today are facing many challenges in maintaining their aging 
aircraft fleet. Avionics systems are of particular concern due to rising problems 
with reliability and obsolescence as these components age (Czerwonka, 2000). 
Aircraft availability will be affected and the maintenance costs can rise 
dramatically if these problems are not addressed appropriately.  Therefore there 
is a need to provide the aircraft operator with means of identifying critical 
system or components in advance of the onset of deteriorating performance to 
allow corrective measures to be taken early which then can prevent 
unnecessary hardships.  
This thesis was conducted to show the need of prognostics towards the 
avionics equipment of aircraft. By using prognostics techniques for evaluating 
the avionics equipment health condition user can be get an indication of the 
equipment’s remaining useful life cycle. This will help the operator to control and 
plan the maintenance activities, thus improving the efficiency of the aircraft 
operation and also the operation cost. Implementation of prognostics in aviation 
field focusing on the avionics equipment will bring a new standard in terms of 
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maintenance activity and increasing the availability and reliability of the aircraft 
fleet thus also bring a huge savings towards airlines operators. 
On-board diagnostics and prognostics are commonly installed in high-value 
critical assets for the purpose of informing users of the assets’ health 
conditions. The importance of monitoring the health condition is due to an 
increase in size and nature of fleet with a number of evolutions that has taken 
place in the aviation industry. A lot of information can be gathered from the 
‘Prognostics and Health Monitoring (PHM) system. The UK Tornado had a 
maintenance Data Panel in its design as well as structural and engine health 
monitoring to identify faults to LRU and LRM in 1972. The EAP designed in 
1982 had a computing system extracting data from the data bus and feeding a 
maintenance data panel which displayed faults in English Language to identify 
faults to card level. In this way, information was used to identify LRUs to remove 
from the aircraft (1st line) and then used at the supplier line to identify modules 
for repair (4th line). 
In aircraft, faults can be found in flight by using the Built-in Test (BIT), which is 
defined as an airborne hardware-software diagnostics tools, recognised to be 
used as early as 1950s (Pecht et al 2001). BIT however predominantly focuses 
on diagnostic means to identify and find faults whereas prognostic system will 
do both diagnostics as well as prognostics. Similar to BIT, the nature and 
concept of prognostics depends on the parameter of equipment it monitors. 
Prognostics systems can be designed to assess from the lowest level of 
component to the highest level of system. A reliable and proper prognostic 
system must be developed to be able to both provide accuracy and 
generalisability (Justice et al., 1999).    
The main goal of this research is to develop a prognostics methodology known 
as the ‘System Level Airborne Avionic Prognostics’ (SLAAP) which aims to 
predict fault for avionics system that is to be used by the Maintenance, Repair 
and Overhaul (MRO). Airborne prognostics at system level is intended to allow 
for deferred maintenance and aircraft is able to be dispatched with known and 
accepted failure condition. The system is enabled through the use of ACARS 
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and data links where information on identified fault can be passed to the ground 
crew even before landing. In the modern airliner and private business jets, civil 
avionics provides vital aspect of navigation, human-machine interface and 
communication system (Moir et al., 2013). 
SLAAP comprises of both diagnostics and prognostics capabilities that gathers 
fault data from LRUs and help identify problems closer to root-cause. At this 
level of analysis, SLAAP is believed to provide confident prediction results when 
uniquely triggered faults are associated with the operating environment when 
aircraft is in-flight. 
Fault diagnostics refers to the process of detecting, isolating, and identifying an 
impending or incipient failure condition that affect components or systems. 
There are several events that lead from fault to failure. During the fault 
diagnostic stage, the system affected can still be operational although it is 
functioning at a degraded condition. Failure diagnostics on the other hand is 
detecting, isolating and identifying a system that has ceased operation. 
Specifically, the term ‘fault detection’ is used when an abnormal operating 
component or system is detected and reported while ‘fault isolation’ is the stage 
of determining which component or system is failing or has failed. Fault 
identification is the term for estimating the nature and extent of the fault 
(Vachtsevanos, 2006).  
In general, fault diagnostics is defined as a set of activities to assess the health 
state of vehicle and its components. From the set of available indications, the 
diagnostics process determines the root cause in order to explain what has 
gone wrong. Sensors and crew observation are part of diagnostic process. 
When a failure occurs, it may not be just from one source of fault. The role of 
fault diagnostics system is to correctly identify the root cause of the problem. 
Out of the many methods used for fault diagnosis, these three methods have 
been most extensively used for fault diagnosis (Aaseng, 2001) : rule-based 
systems, which usually rely on the ‘if-then’ analysis; condition-based systems 
that uses empirical data from past failure and model-based systems deriving 
failure causes from description of the system components, the relationship 
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between components and information about symptoms related to the 
components. 
A prognostic system can be defined as a process of predicting the failure 
occurrences of a system by assessing the extent of deviation or degradation 
from expected normal operating conditions (Pecht, 2008). As soon as fault is 
detected, actionable decision is made and status of equipment is hoped to be 
improved immediately. Optimum capability of prognostics approach is in the 
precision at predicting the failure time or the remaining useful life of a subject. In 
order to prevent any critical failure, it is important to understand the behaviour of 
the equipment. (Jie Gu et al., 2007) in a study reported that there were three 
different methodology of prognostics when dealing with electronics. Namely, 
using expendable prognostic cells, such as “canaries” and fuses, that fail earlier 
than the host product to provide advance warning of failure; (2) monitoring and 
reasoning of parameters, such as shifts in performance parameters, 
progression of defects, that are precursors to impending failure; and (3) 
modelling stress and damage in electronics utilizing exposure conditions (e.g., 
usage, temperature, vibration, radiation) coupled with physics–of–failure (PoF) 
models to compute accumulated damage and assess remaining life. The 
simplest form of prognostics is said to be life usage model which is said to be 
applicable to components that are mass produced (Schwabacher, 2005). Life 
usage model uses statistics data to calculate the remaining useful life and 
combine large sample of component to be analysed statistically to analyse 
usage data.  
A study has outlined four fundamental notions for methods in predicting 
remaining useful life, which are: electromechanical systems age as a function of 
use, passage of time and environmental condition; component aging and 
damage accumulation is a monotonic process that involves physical and 
chemical composition of individual component; signs of aging are detectable 
prior to failure over time; correlate signs of aging with a model of component 
aging and thereby estimate remaining useful life of individual components 
(Saxena et al., 2008). 
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Prognostics is often associated with condition-based maintenance where;  
prognostic system decides when maintenance actions are required to be done. 
This condition-based method is preferred over time-based or event-driven 
maintenance methods, ideally because it results in less system downtime and 
only required maintenance actions are taken into consideration.  
Similar to diagnostics methodology, prognostics methodologies are categorised 
into three in the field of complex engineering system; which are physics based 
model of a system, experts system approach (rule-based) and data-driven (data 
mining) approach (Schwabacher, 2005). Schwabacher argues that algorithms 
that use data-driven approach may be the way forward instead of using a hand-
built model based because prognosis learns model directly from data. Luo et. Al 
(2008) on the other hand, describes prognostics methodology in three different 
approaches which are knowledge based, data-driven and model-based. He 
developed an integrated prognostic process for an automotive suspension 
subsystem via model-based simulations. The model-based approach he 
utilised, describes what Schwabacher refers as physics-based model approach. 
The models were constructed based on different random load conditions 
(modes). In the model, an Interacting Multiple Model (IMM) is used to track the 
hidden damage for deterioration monitoring and the remaining-life prediction 
was performed by mixing mode-based life predictions via time-averaged mode 
probabilities. Currently, a vast number of researches have been done in 
prognostics but there is inadequacy for system level consideration of 
prognostics researches. Mostly only addresses the prognostics of individual 
component and subsystems (Amit et al., 2001).  
In a paper on the impact and potential benefit of standardisation supporting 
interoperability of PHM, Sheppard et. al. (2008) highlighted that the focus of 
prognostics actually lies in area of being able to predict from information about 
some system state when significant future event affecting the performance of 
the system such as failure might occur. This estimation comes about to 
predicting remaining useful life of a component or a system (Sheppard et al., 
2008).  However, they have suggested that the term time to failure (TTF) as 
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being more appropriate for calculating system level prognosis. The term TTF in 
their context is a measurement of a system state to some failure or interest in 
the system as opposed to (Vachtsevanos, 2006) definition of TTF. (Hines and 
Usynin, 2008) also highlighted that prognostics modules are usually developed 
to predict one of the following: 
1. Remaining Useful Life (RUL), which is the amount of time, in terms of 
operating hours, cycles, or other measures the component will continue 
to meets its design specification. 
2. Time to Failure (TTF) which defines the time a component is expected o 
fail 
3. Probability of Failure (POF). Which is the probability distribution of failure 
of the component 
Correspondingly, Amit et. al. (2001) have defined a similar classification to 
prognostics which includes TTF, RUL, POF and the probability that component 
life, will end before the next maintenance or inspection. They have however, 
categorise prognostics differently than previous researchers, whereby methods 
of prognostics is categorised by the type of information the prognosis hold and 
use. The type of methods is defined as Time-to-failure data-based, Stressed-
based and Effects-based. By looking at the kind of information retrieved in 
Time-to-failure data based approach, it is merely statistical methods as it uses 
history data and fit them into any distribution function of choice. The stressed 
based method mentioned is actually the data driven approach as it uses prior 
observations of explanatory variables and correlate them with time to failure to 
predict the time to failure of a component. The suggested model to be used in 
this method is somehow really interesting as this model has not been applied in 
this field. This technique merges failure time and stress data to modify baseline 
hazard rate to form new hazard rate. The last method described as Effects-
based Prognostics seems so close to what have been categorised as 
probability based methods according to other researches which uses 
degradation information to track failure. For this method, Markov Chain-based 
model was used. 
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1.2 Research problem 
The maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) business are in great demand, 
thus forcing the airlines to depend on third party parts suppliers and services in 
order to aircraft maintained.  Some other problems that the MRO industry are 
facing relate to the logistics network, owing to the nature of demands for aircraft 
maintenance repair parts, which airline operators perceive difficulties in parts 
demand forecasting (Ghobbar and Friend, 2002). On the same basis, MRO 
network performance is to be agile and lean at the same time (Pipe, 2008). In 
order to be able to provide the right part at the right time, there is a need to 
forecast the individual systems or subsystems to predict maintenance time. This 
is when prognostics approach comes into play. With the implementation of 
avionic prognostics, significant improvements on current maintenance process 
with the reduction of No Fault Found (NFF), Retest OK (RTOK) and Can Not 
Duplicate (CND) incidences will then be provided.  
As a result, there will be fewer opportunities to remove a good unit, and a higher 
probability that any random component removed will be the faulty unit. Thus, 
leading to the research problem that this research study addresses: 
“What kind of prognostics approach is best to be developed to improve 
maintenance process and availability of avionics systems to be specific and 
aircraft in general?” 
1.3 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to fulfil the objectives of condition-based 
maintenance which is to optimise availability of high-value critical asset whilst 
reducing overall maintenance cost through development of prognostics. This 
methodology is aimed to find the time-to-failure of a system to provide ample 
time for maintenance personnel to take action before any avionic equipment 
fails. System in this context refers to the level where prognoses will be 
analysed. An increase in system complexity and component quality has resulted 
in a shift from component level towards system level prognostics. This research 
work involves the integration of three research subjects that are prognostic 
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methodology, degradation model and time-to-failure prediction. Four research 
objectives were identified to complete the aim of this research. 
The objectives are to: 
1) analyse the dependency of avionic systems including Line Replaceable 
Units (LRU) for fault propagation behaviour degradation  
2) research and develop methods to predict  the remaining useful life of 
avionics LRUs  
3) research and develop methods to evaluate and predict the degradation 
performances of avionic systems 
4) develop software simulation systems to evaluate methods developed above 
considering aircraft environment and flight conditions in which avionics 
experience 
The first objective will focus on the relationship of components in the LRUs and 
LRMs which affect the fault propagation of the system. Valuable information 
provided at this stage will help provide precise fault to failure recognition for 
prognostics for avionics which needed more attention. 
The second objective uses the first objective’s results to develop the prediction 
of remaining useful life of LRUs/LRMs in the avionic system intended to study. 
The third objective is then to offer a higher level of prognostic methodology that 
is to include the degradation behaviour and the performance of the avionic 
system. Currently, the prognostics methodology is only focused on mechanical 
parts of aircraft. 
The last objective is to put everything in a nutshell by deriving a software 
system which is able to evaluate and simulate aircraft environment and flight 
condition. 
This study carries a great impact in the avionics industry whereby, SLAAP 
provides an optimised solution for maintenance, repair and overhaul offering 
new enhanced troubleshooting management. 
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1.4 The proposed model 
Although there is a significant amount of published work on developed 
methodology for diagnostics, only a handful was reported on prognostics. There 
are even less studies dedicated specifically to avionics system prognostics at 
system level. The main contribution of this research work is an improved 
approach for prognostics in the area of airborne avionics system for the use of 
the maintenance personnel. The characteristics that distinguish this knowledge 
structuring schema as an innovative approach are as follows: 
 The approach is intended to model design problems according to 
leading-edge theories and models of design. 
 The approach makes a step forward in prognostics by paying attention to 
the enhancement of condition-based maintenance. 
Using the proposed prognostics methodology, the failures of avionics systems 
are expected to be handled more effectively by delivering real time advisory to 
secure operators next flight and identify corrective maintenance. On the other 
hand, using the degradation signatures, current avionics health condition as 
well as remaining life can be predicted. In addition, a correlation method to 
validate the confidence level for release of aircraft with environment condition 
parameter incorporated in the analysis to provide better prognostics results. 
Model to assess the current health and time to failure is proposed as in Figure 
1-1: 
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Figure 1-1: Mainframe of methodology used in this study 
The proposed research methodology consists of three main branches which are 
the degradation model, usage of relevant failure data and reliability prediction. 
The degradation model makes use of Markov modelling techniques while 
making use of the failure data, and the reliability prediction uses Cox’ 
Regression theory to correlate life degradation (failure) with environmental 
condition such as temperature. These new integrated models will then be 
solved to determine the time to failure of the system 
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1.5 Thesis outline 
This thesis is presented in nine chapters as illustrated in Figure 1-2: 
Chapter  Title Synopsis 
1 Introduction Describes the need and motivation of this 
research and introduces the problem 
statement and research questions. This 
section provides an overview of the need 
for prognostics, current maintenance 
practices and issues in the area of 
maintenance, repair and overhaul.  
 
2 Prognostic Techniques for 
Avionics 
Comprehensively reviews the prognostics 
and its application, also its advantages and 
drawbacks. This section provides the 
techniques currently used for prognostics in 
avionics. 
 
3 Research Methodology Discusses the methodology proposed and 
how they merge in this study.  
 
4 Remaining Useful Life (RUL) 
Prediction Methods in Line 
Replaceable Units (LRU) 
Describes the fundamental theory behind 
research methodology that was chosen to 
be used in this research work. 
 
5 Terrain Awareness and Warning 
System 
Describes the purpose, composition, 
functions, and specification related to 
TAWS/EGPWS. 
 
6 Results Embeds the validation using field data into 
the discussion of the results. 
 
7 Discussion Discusses the findings that could be 
potential solutions for industry problems. 
 
8 Conclusion This chapter concludes the research work 
and gives direction for further research. 
 
Figure 1-2: Thesis layout 
 
 
 
 27 
 
  CHAPTER 2
 PROGNOSTICS TECHNIQUES FOR 2
AVIONICS 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse evolutionary findings and techniques used 
in handling prognostics problems. Literature studies in pertinent to prognostics, 
prognostics methodology and prognostics effects in relation to aviation 
maintenance are studied and analysed for understanding. This chapter also 
provides a background study on how the problems are tackled by other 
researchers. In this chapter, prognostic studies will be identified by its 
classification and in accordance to the current trends and applications. Finally, 
this chapter will determine the research gap in the area of prognostic 
methodology for airborne avionics. 
2.1 Introduction 
In 2001, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amended a ruling on the 
operating rules which requires certain airplanes to be equipped with an FAA-
approved terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) or the enhanced 
ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). Such equipment was designed to 
prevent Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT). According to a paper by Airbus 
(2014) entitled “Commercial Aviation Accidents 1958-2013 – A Statistical 
Analysis”, CFIT, which refers to in-flight collision with terrain, water or obstacle 
without indication of loss of control, CFIT contributes about 23% of total number 
of accidents since 1994 under the fatal accidents category. A fatal accident in 
this case is an event in which at least one passenger or crewmember is fatally 
injured or later dies of his or her injury.  Both the TAWS and the EGPWS, like 
other avionics system are quite a challenge to monitor.  This is reflected by a 
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study done for electronics equipment where the wear-out time has been longer 
than the life cycle of the whole system (Sundström et al., 2008). At times also, 
electronics equipment fails without any definite measurable signs of fault. 
Therefore, it is important to establish a proper prognostic method and precursor 
of failure to be able to detect, isolate, and achieve prognostics outcome. 
Particularly important is the system level prognostics as compared to the single 
component level because, when faults or failure occur in airborne avionic 
system, technicians will simply remove an LRU rather than an electronic 
component such as a resistor or a memory card in the LRU. System level 
prognostics referred in this study is the prognostics levels of between level 4 
and level 5 as summarised in Table 2-1.  
Table 2-1: Failure site and prognostics level in electronics (Jie Gu et al., 2007) 
Prognostic level Site 
Level 0  chip and on-chip sites 
Level 1 parts and components that cannot be disassembled and 
reassembled with the expectation that the item would still 
work 
Level 2  circuit board and interconnects connecting the 
components to the circuit card 
Level 3 enclosure, chassis, drawer and connections for circuit 
cards 
Level 4 entire electronic system (LRU/ notebook) 
Level 5 multi-electronic systems and external connections 
between different systems (LRU and cockpit display) 
As shown in the Table 2-1, each level is grouped according to similar electronic 
interaction where group level 0, being the lowest level that describes chips and 
on-chips sites. Regular electronic components like transistors and resistors 
alike fall under the grouping of ‘level 1’. Level 5 is the highest level considering 
the intergroup interaction among multi-electronic systems. 
As with the electronics system in the aircraft, the LRUs (level 4) are removed to 
enable a component (level 2 or 3) to be removed, hence a quicker turn-around 
time for the aircraft. Many LRUs in Boeing 757/767, Airbus A300/A310 
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McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and Lockheed L-1011 used to have digital codes to 
display types of fault that was detected (Vachtsevanos, 2006). Over time, this 
became less effective as systems became increasingly integrated with each 
other.  
Because of an increase in system complexity and component quality, it is useful 
to be using the results of a level 1, 2 or 3, as it contributes to the failure of a 
larger system. However, different prognostic methods are needed to cater each 
level as complexity accumulates as the levels increase. Intensity of factors 
affecting degradation may also be of different rates. For example, an increase in 
temperature at level 0 does increase the rate of degradation at level 5. This 
though may or may not be affected at the same rate. A hybrid approach to 
handling this issue maybe the way forward as industries are lacking in hybrid 
approaches in electronics (Tuchband, 2007).  
2.2 Avionics design and development process 
The evolution of avionics with an increase in utilisation in avionics technology to 
be used in engine control and flight control began since 1950s (Moir et al., 
2013). The advancement of avionics has been influenced by not only the 
aerospace industry, military and space but also the modern information 
technology and communication system existing today. 
The improvement of avionics component in terms of trends in integrated circuit 
development as compared to Moore’s Law can be seen in Figure 2-1. The 
number of transistors on a chip for microprocessors used in aerospace 
increased with the advancement in information technology. The effect from this 
evolution brings not only hardware issues but also software issues where most 
avionic components rely upon.  
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Figure 2-1: Microprocessors used in aerospace application (Moir et al., 2013). 
2.3 Importance of prognostics in avionics maintenance process 
Maintenance optimization is a process that attempts to find the best balance of 
the maintenance requirements in terms of contractual, economics, technical, 
and the resources used to carry out the maintenance program such as 
workmanship spares, consumables items, equipment, facilities, and others.  
When the maintenance optimization is effectively implemented it will improve 
system availability, reduce overall maintenance cost, improve equipment 
reliability, and improve system safety.  In the former case, optimization is 
performed to choose the option that generates the largest cost avoidance and 
or maximizes the availability for an individual system. In the latter, optimization 
is performed to choose the optimal subsystems to be maintained and meet 
availability at the enterprise level. 
The maintenance efficiency of systems is an important economic and 
commercial issue. The main difficulties result from the choice of maintenance 
actions. A bad choice can lead to a maintenance with an over cost that is not 
acceptable. Because of the increase of involved technologies and the different 
interactions between components, the decision of a maintenance action is very 
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complex and requires a diagnostic and prognostic analysis. Maintaining such a 
system basically consists in replacing components that are unable to perform 
their function by new ones.  
Maintenance activities are costly for several reasons. The first one is the issue 
of aircraft on ground (AOG) during the maintenance phase. The longer the 
maintenance phase is, the more costly it will become. It follows that the 
maintenance phase must be reduced to the strict minimal operation, which 
requires the correct replacement of components. This requires time-on decision 
relying on an efficient and complete analysis of the health of the system when it 
is operating.  
The second reason causing high maintenance cost is when emergency or 
sudden failure arises. If a component suddenly fails and the system fully breaks 
down, it automatically requires some unscheduled maintenance actions which 
are more costly than scheduled maintenance. To partly avoid this issue, 
prognostic methods are used in order to perform preventive maintenance. It 
refers to replacing components during a scheduled maintenance phase that are 
not faulty yet but that will inevitably become faulty before the date of the next 
scheduled maintenance phase.   
In the maintenance field, the maintenance levels are concerned with grouping 
the tasks for each location where maintenance activities are performed. The 
criteria in which the maintenance tasks selected at each level include; task 
complexity, personnel skill-level requirement, special maintenance equipment 
and economic measures. In the military, the first level of maintenance process 
normally starts from where the system is operated and the highest level or the 
fourth level is usually the OEM. In the commercial aviation industry though, 
maintenance are categorised by only the line maintenance and the heavy 
maintenance.  
In line with the initial purpose of prognostics which is to reduce costs of 
operating safely and maintenance efficiency, there are basically three types of 
maintenance in military or the commercial aviation alike. They are the on-
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condition maintenance, hard time maintenance and condition-based 
maintenance. The elaboration on the three types of maintenance is described in 
the Table 2-2. Unlike the on-condition maintenance and the hard time 
maintenance, condition-based maintenance is a predictive maintenance 
process. Luo (2008) described the on-condition and hard time maintenance 
processes as generally being corrective and preventive. This is because on-
condition maintenance process will offer maintenance when needed by 
monitoring the rate of deterioration of an item, while hard time maintenance is a 
preventive maintenance strategy where maintenance is done on a timely basis. 
In comparison to hard time maintenance, the proactive on-condition 
maintenance measures some condition that is a better predictor of functional 
failure than time thereby increasing interval between reworks of each unit. That 
increased interval decreases logistic costs and decreases opportunities for 
maintenance-induced defects.  
The corrective maintenance is also proactive in nature but utilises intelligent 
sensing and analysing of failure precursors for each item. Corrective 
maintenance will only be done when breakdown can possibly happen. Further 
monitoring is needed to ensure parts are replaced or exchanged before they 
fail. It causes discovery of potential failures rather than allowing functional 
failures to occur. It localizes the requirements for logistic support by discovering 
these failures at convenient times and locations.  
One advantage of corrective maintenance is that part replacements will only be 
changed when necessary. One downside to it is parts replacement planning. 
Preventive maintenance on the other hand, follows a timely scheduled and 
parts are replaced based on trends reported in equipment log to determine the 
optimum time for parts exchange. Studies have revealed that both corrective 
and preventive maintenance are not cost-effective. Last but not least is the 
condition-based maintenance which is carried out in response to a significant 
deterioration in an equipment or unit. The time to perform this maintenance 
action is determined by monitoring the actual state of the system, its 
performance and other condition parameter. This would mean that the system is 
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in its most efficient state and maintenance would be done when it’s cost 
effective.  
For condition-based maintenance in avionics maintenance process, Byington et. 
al. (2004) developed a modular application allowing information to be accessed 
via personal data assistant (PDA) for the maintenance crew on ground, building 
upon open architecture designs and utilising reusable, modular components to 
enhance diagnosis and reduce ambiguity.  The advantage of this system they 
developed is that the study was able to provide less maintenance hierarchy 
incorporating interoperable technology testing. Nevertheless, the study stops at 
diagnosis in which it should have been better if prognostics were included, as 
the condition-based maintenance is best implemented with the employment of 
prognostics. 
Table 2-2: Approved maintenance process recognised by CAA 
Types of 
maintenance 
Definition Characterisation Time 
done 
On-condition A preventive process 
resulting from inspection 
or testing of a 
component to determine 
service continuation. 
Corrective 
maintenance 
Timely 
basis 
Hard time A preventive process in 
which deterioration of a 
component is limited to 
an acceptable level by 
maintenance action. 
Preventive 
maintenance 
Timely 
basis 
Condition-based 
maintenance 
A process in which 
information on 
components are gained 
from continuously 
collecting, analysing and 
interpreting service 
experience for corrective 
actions. 
Predictive 
maintenance 
When 
needed 
The maintenance, repair and overhaul business are in great demand, resulting 
airlines to depend on third party parts suppliers and services. So as to keep the 
costs at the minimum, it is ideal to have a system like the condition-based 
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system that will minimise downtime and have maintenance only when it occurs, 
while knowing when to act before any fault occurs. Other benefits also include 
less time spent on inspection and optimised maintenance planning. In many 
years to come, this kind of maintenance will be practised more frequently as 
compared to the time based and event driven scheduled maintenance. Usual 
methods used are model based which needs precise measurement and data, 
and another method is the data driven. The data driven method can be random 
that makes it fall under the probabilistic prediction method. This method is 
considered easier in the sense that it is easier to detail out data. However, with 
scarce data resources available, this method is useful. 
 Degradation or fault occurrence in electronics/ avionic systems 2.3.1
Electronic components generate generous amount of heat. Components in 
electronic equipment are stored, packed, and tight to each other, and thus the 
possibility of overheating can be overwhelming. Whilst this is true, aircraft 
designers take great pains to provide cooling for avionics equipment by means 
of air wash, forced air, cooling fans or closed cycle refrigeration system to 
ensure temperatures do not exceed 70°C through the ambient range of -40°C 
to +90°C. In fact equipment is usually maintained to function between 20°C to 
40°C. Rigorous qualifications testing using DO-160 or MIL-STD-810 is used to 
gain confidence and evidence to support certification, also includes vibration, 
shock, and humidity. Deviation from declared condition need to be understood 
by ground testers so this would be useful flight information to gather. Humidity 
in tropical climates is often a cause of NFF as a result of tracking on PC boards 
which disappears when the boards are dried. In this case it is often difficult to 
treat components in isolation from boards they are mounted on.  
It has been reported that as operating temperatures increase, components are 
prone to failure (Saxena et al., 2008). In effect, they have outlined the four 
fundamental notions for methods in predicting remaining useful life, which are  
 Electromechanical systems age as a function of use, passage of time 
and environmental condition 
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 Component aging and damage accumulation is a monotonic process that 
involves physical and chemical composition of individual component 
 Signs of aging are detectable prior to overt failure over time 
 It is possible to correlate signs of aging with a model of component aging 
and thereby estimate remaining useful life of individual components 
Unlike mechanical parts such as engines and pumps that are replaced during 
overhaul if needed, an electronic component is not repaired to ‘as new’ 
condition. The failure rate of an electronic component changes during its life 
cycle due to internal and external factors, which create three distinct failure rate 
zones. The failure rate of a component is relatively constant during its normal 
operating life, or zone, and then failures are induced by external stresses. Since 
components are not repaired to ‘as new’, the subcomponents continue to 
accumulate operating time and eventually begin to fail due to internal stresses. 
Since internal stresses are added on, the failure rate of a component will 
increase after its useful life. This period is known as wear out zone.  
Electronics degradations are mostly caused by thermal cycling which involve 
rapid changes in temperature causing thermal expansion and contraction. This 
has been known to contribute to wire lifts and die solder degradation, chronic 
temperature and electrical stress, voltage spikes and also by chronic over 
voltage and over current. In general, electronics wear out are mainly caused by 
the electromigration, transient electrical stresses, excessive heat, 
electromagnetic interference, vibration and also mechanical failures. Denson 
(1998) has stated in his study shown in Figure 2-2 that the majority of causes in 
electronics are found in parts. The pie chart also shows the other factors 
contributing to electronics failure in his analysis. 
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Figure 2-2: Failure causes in electronics (Denson, 1998) 
These factors are possible to be monitored through the use of sensors, should 
there be any prognostic application. To be exact, although it will be quite 
challenging; it is far worthwhile to apply a prognostic approach in a complex and 
intensely sensitive equipment, than at a smaller, lower level component.. 
 No Fault Found (NFF) 2.3.2
Highly integrated avionics design in newer generation of aircraft puts 
maintenance personnel in need to be highly skilled in performing their tasks to 
get aircraft flying again. This scenario is due to the fact that the duration of 
performing maintenance is associated with man-hour expenditure and aircraft 
downtime. With aircraft downtime being a problem, which then contributes to 
the performance evaluation of airline and civil aircraft (Knotts, 1999). 
One of the factors contributing to the underlying problem is unable to correctly 
diagnose problems from reports provided by pilot and data readily available 
from the aircraft will indirectly increase operating costs for airlines. These 
problems encountered by flight crews can be challenging for the crew on 
ground to detect. Sources of fault in equipment are hardly detected (cannot be 
reproduced) because they only occur intermittently. Sometimes, the problems 
encountered were poorly described or not properly addressed in the 
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maintenance log. When the problem reported cannot be proven to be faulty, it is 
called Can Not Duplicate (CND), but when there are no problems found in the 
findings, it is called No Fault Found.  
Direct maintenance costs are contributed by 18% of avionics and electrical 
unscheduled maintenance with 40% of related equipment removals are 
classified as No Fault Found (NFF), which means that an LRU will show that 
condition is faulty while aircraft is off the ground but seems fine when on ground 
(Wu et al., 2004). Knotts (1999) has cited that an average of 8000 component 
removals fleet per month in an audit that has taken place at British Airways, 
whereby a total of 14% of components, across all workshops, were found to 
have NFF. Certain avionic equipment experienced 30% NFF. Various terms 
such as Retest OK (RTOK), no fault indicated (NFI), and no trouble found 
(NTF), are also referring to the inability to replicate field failures during ground 
run. It has also been found that more than 85% of CND failure in the avionic 
field will account for more than 90% of total maintenance costs (Williams, et. al, 
1998).  
The number of documented CND, NFF, and RTOK indicates a large amount of 
money and manpower spent in the pursuit of high availability and reliability of 
electronic systems of aircraft (Byington et al., 2004). Some NFF conditions are 
caused by intermittent faults. Intermittent faults seldom appear unless a unit is 
in a stressful operating environment. The lack of fault traceable data, such as 
operating time to failure and environmental conditions when a fault occurred, 
obstructs the potential ability for effective avionic prognostics and failure 
predictions on an aircraft. Although Built-In Test (BIT) that was a simple push 
button that illuminates different colour lights to test for functionality (Bird et al., 
2005) has been around for quite a while, it can misidentify faults. Even with the 
sophistication of Built-In Test equipment (BITE) and Centralised Maintenance 
Systems, fault detection is still considerably high (Johnson, 1996). With this 
said, it is possible that the faults were actually generated from the BITE. One 
incident reported by Johnson (1996) on Lufthansa’s A320 fleet of operation 
where out of an average 17 LRUs were removed each day, only two were 
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confirmed faulty. Airline operators are constantly faced with irregular operational 
problems that are developed from unexpected aircraft system failures, which 
may be followed by a reschedule of flight service or aircraft reroute. Events 
such as flight cancellations, delay and reshuffling of aircraft maintenance 
scheduling may also take place (Ghobbar and Friend, 2002). In Malaysia, 
according to a data taken from Harun, aircraft maintenance costs for Malaysia 
Airlines in the year 1996/1997 was estimated at USD140 million and aircraft 
technical delay costs USD5.5 million a year (Harun, 1998). 
Therefore, by providing an early warning of failure, enough time before it 
eventually happens will help plan and organise replacement parts. Prognostics 
in airborne avionic system is all about providing accurate enough fault data that 
contingency plan can be scheduled rather than leaving it until breakdown takes 
place and handle problem as it happens. So, by providing consistent health 
assessment on aircraft system, NFF can be reduced as fault prediction is done 
much earlier. 
 Flight delays 2.3.3
One of the problems faced these days are delays. Figure 2-3 illustrates on 
departure delays causes in the year 2009. Presented in the Table 2-3, are the 
factors contributing to the delay under the ‘airline’ category. In brief, airlines 
must foresee defects problem seriously to cater for the public demand which is 
escalating in the near future. Hence, the relevancy of the prognostic 
methodology for airborne avionic systems is considered imperative. This is 
because flight planning and airport planning relate closely to time. As shown in 
Figure 2-3, delays are mostly caused by airlines, and problems are mainly 
caused by aircraft defect. Therefore, once prognostics systems are in place, 
defective components are hoped to be solved just enough time before any 
planned take-off, thus reducing fault rectification time. It is when unscheduled 
maintenance is urgently needed that aircraft needs to be on-ground thus 
causing delays.  
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Figure 2-3: Breakdown of departure delay cause by hour (Eurocontrol, 2009) 
Table 2-3: Breakdown of technical and aircraft equipment IATA (Eurocontrol, 
2009) 
Category of Technical & Aircraft Equipment IATA category Apr-09 
41-Aircraft Defects 277,959 
42-Scheduled Maintenance 24,815 
43-Non-Scheduled Maintenance 49,514 
44-Spares and Maintenance Equipment 12,631 
45-AOG Spares 3,839 
46-Aircraft Change 161,248 
47-Stand-By Aircraft 15,862 
48-Scheduled Cabin Configuration 2,526 
Every change in schedule that is caused by delays will affect costs. Therefore it 
is the aim of this research to provide a solution to reduce the time taken to 
isolate the fault or it may lead to deferred maintenance. The total overall time 
will consequently affect logistics through a well-planned maintenance system. 
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2.4 Prognostics’ advantages and drawbacks 
Prognostics advantages outweigh its drawbacks in certain areas of applications 
and vice versa in others. The application may be worthwhile when the return of 
investment is positive. Otherwise, it will only be a waste of time. Some of the 
benefits of prognostics method are failure avoidance, positive logistics support, 
maximum life usage, opportunistic maintenance support, fast turnaround time, 
low aircraft on ground records, better mission planning and most importantly no 
unexpected breakdowns. Thus, RTOK and CND numbers could effectively be 
reduced. Historically, machines have relying upon experience of handler or 
operator. Trouble arises when the operator is off site. Machines are only looked 
at when they are no longer function. No warning or signs provided. With 
prognostics, complex machines can provide early warning and ability to exploit 
useful data effectively. Predictive prognostics is indeed a need and theoretically 
promising.  
Studies have reasoned that when it is possible to use available data to perform 
diagnostics, it is not possible to stretch on further to detect and monitor 
degradation. Of course the benefits will show in a cycle as everything will boil 
down to costs. With application of prognostics, machines’ failure can be 
predicted, thus logistics and maintenance support will be well planned. This 
then reduces impromptu downtime and unwanted surprises. Because actions 
can be taken through known information (data), better scheduling could be 
realised. Organised actions and precise decisions help in controlling costs 
within budget, which is the ultimatum of any companies.  
Some challenges of prognostics on the other hand involve the preparation and 
prognostic installation costs. A well-planned study must be thoroughly laid out 
prior to the implementation. Not all areas need prognostics works. Something 
simple and cheap does not need anything complicated. For example, when a 
light bulb fails, it just fails. A sensor would help monitor current flow but 
monitoring a light bulb is not critical. The application of prognostic is worthless 
as light bulbs are cheap and are easily fixed. However, it is not something very 
impossible as the capability of diagnostics and prognostics are desirable.   
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As a conclusion, prognostics has been shown to be beneficial for health 
management of systems, and provides a number of potential benefits including, 
methods to assess the reliability of a product in its actual life cycle conditions to 
determine the advent of failure and mitigate system risks, ability of a service or 
a system to be functional when it is requested for use or operation and cost 
avoidance systems and can be summarized as: 
a) Avoiding of unexpected failures with consequences reduction of 
unscheduled maintenance actions: 
 Minimizing the cost of unscheduled maintenance 
 Increasing availability 
 Reducing risk of loss of system  
 Increased human safety 
b) Reduction in no-fault-founds: 
 The data collected and continuous monitoring used in prognostics 
can be helpful to flight line and shop maintenance personnel in 
locating a faulty item. The RTOK problem is well known and has 
resisted many attempts at reducing it. The accumulated damage 
information provided by prognostics assists in localizing a problem 
and informs the test more likely to reveal it. 
c) Minimizing loss of remaining life: 
 Minimizing the amount of remaining life thrown away by scheduled 
maintenance actions 
d) Reduction in the required number of repair stations and stores locations: 
 The ability to control the occurrence of maintenance actions leads 
to the ability to control the location at which they occur, thus 
reducing the required number. 
 In addition, foreknowledge of spares requirements allows them to 
be delivered ‘just-in-time’, thus reducing the spares stockholding 
levels. This leads to a substantial simplification of the spares 
supply chain. 
e) Improved repair: 
 Better diagnosis and fault isolation 
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 Reduction in collateral damage during repair 
 The avoidance of costs associated with unscheduled repairs, such 
as assets and crew down time, special spares shipments, and 
replacement crews can be a major cost saving as well as reducing 
the number of non-mission capable assets. 
f) Ability to adjust assets usage according to its actual readiness: 
 Presently mission planners have no knowing which of their 
available assets is most like able to complete the planned mission.  
2.5 Cost benefit of prognostics 
In order to show the best value direction in implementing prognostic 
methodology, a cost benefit analysis has been illustrated as described by 
Janasak and Beshears (2007). The Table 2-4 illustrates the benefits, 
significantly on the costs, with the implementation of condition-based 
maintenance. The example shows that the change in the maintenance interval 
affects the life cycle cost, availability and the percentage of failures avoided. 
While it is obvious that condition-based maintenance provides greater cost 
benefits in terms of cost, additional elements may need to be considered and 
weighed in for optimum results. Some factors that could be taken into 
consideration include economic cost, mission and safety implications towards 
implementing each maintenance approach. 
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Table 2-4: Example of cost benefit study to determine what prognostic feature is 
available (Janasak and Beshears, 2007) 
Sustainment 
Approach 
Unscheduled Scheduled Condition-Based 
Maintenance 
Interval/Prognostic 
Distance 
0 hour 1920 hours 396 hours 
Mean LOC $83,319 $181,094 $109,358 
Standard deviation 
LOC 
$16,066 $12,505 $21,067 
Mean availability 97.47% 95.26% 97.26% 
Standard deviation 
availability 
0.61% 0.49% 0.66% 
Failures avoided 0.00% 75.52% 64.53% 
 
2.6 Prognostic applications 
 Prognostic applications in aerospace platforms 2.6.1
The Table 2-5 is a survey done by Ofsthun on subsystems in order to elaborate 
its usages and features normally used in aerospace contexts. In the table, for 
application of IVHM in avionics, only diagnostics was declared. This was 
probably because prognostics was quite new then. He has also pointed out that 
the traditional built-in-tests generally have not provided the accuracy needed to 
impact the operational efficiency in maintenance. Thus, the overall goal 
achievement of IVHM should be to have an improved and extension to BIT 
approaches in subsystems such as avionics. In his article also, Ofsthun 
highlighted lesson learnt relating specific IVHM users goal to diagnostics and 
prognostics. This study sees similar needs which include: 
 To ensure effective IVHM outcome, prognostics must cover an integrated 
degradation analysis that can measure equipment performance 
 Benefit analysis as well as cost efficiency for maintenance repair and 
overhaul should be taken into consideration 
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 A top-level system framework is needed to integrate across subsystems  
Wide-spread adoption of integrated health management has been slow due to 
competing factors that have to be satisfied within the prognostics community. 
Some issues include the life expectancy of an aircraft and cost versus benefit 
factor. From an engineering perspective, the development of prognostics to 
mitigate the greatest risks is dependent upon accurate data collection. The data 
needed for maturation analysis is usually difficult both to obtain as well as to 
collect. On the cost-benefit challenges of prognostics, it is best to apply 
prognostics in areas that are historically the least reliable, have failure modes 
that greatly impact operation success and comprises of subsystems that are 
difficult to diagnose. 
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Table 2-5: IVHM features and techniques used in aerospace platforms (Ofsthun, 
2002) 
Subsystem type IVHM features IVHM techniques 
Avionics Diagnostics Multilevel false alarm filters 
Field loadable software/ data modules 
Vehicle level BIT context correlation 
Electrical Diagnostics Vehicle electrical supply and distribution status 
correlated with subsystem failure indications 
Actuators Diagnostics, 
prognostics 
Motor current, temperature, vibration and 
position sensors compared to a performance 
model to identify failures and  performance 
degradation 
Environmental 
control 
Diagnostics, 
prognostics 
Temperature, pressure, flow rate, vibration and 
valve position sensors compared to a 
performance model to identify failures and 
degradations 
Propulsion Diagnostics, 
prognostics 
Engine monitored for foreign object intrusion 
and dynamic engine performance parameters 
compared to a performance model to identify 
failures and degradations, debris density, 
particle size measurement in oil, low cycle 
fatigue, rain-flow analysis and blade 
temperature 
Hydraulics Diagnostics, 
prognostics, 
inspections 
Fluid levels, pressures, valve positions 
monitored to detect leaks identify performance 
degradations and eliminate manual inspections, 
debris density, particle size measurement in oil 
and fluid 
Structures Prognostics, 
Inspections 
Real time intelligent load monitoring using flight 
control data to minimize scheduled inspections 
and maximize useful vehicle life, loads, 
corrosion, implications on composites, load 
test, strain and pressure. 
All Anomaly 
detection 
Aggregate air vehicle parameters correlated to 
identify anomalous behaviour requiring further 
investigation or maturation 
Health inspection and monitoring spacecraft and aircraft systems are 
often difficult and costly, often because relevant sensors cannot be installed at 
the right places. Therefore prognostics methods have been developed and 
incorporated in the health management systems of the latest military aircraft 
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and civilian aircraft, in order to reduce the overall life-cycle cost and improve 
flight readiness. Figure 2-4 below shows a schematic of the PHM process 
inputs, computations and outputs. For clarity, the figure shows only three sensor 
inputs and three models. The actual number of these will be much larger in 
practice. 
 
Figure 2-4: Remaining Life Prediction (Wilkinson et al. 2004) 
Sensor data provided by a variety of on-engine and on-aircraft sensors is first 
compressed and reduced. This process greatly reduces an otherwise 
unmanageable quantity of data, without sacrificing a significant amount of 
information. A life consumption algorithm, utilizing a variety of life models, 
knowledge of the design ant the constituent material properties, then computes 
the amount of life used with an associated confidence interval for each of the 
possible failures sites.  
Since there are sources of uncertainty, such as material properties and the 
physical dimensions of the various structures making up the electronics 
assembly, there will be corresponding uncertainty associated with the life 
consumption computation. The reasoning process combines these uncertainties 
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using a decision support system to give a remaining life prediction for the 
complete system, again with an associated confidence interval.  
 Prognostics work in electronic components  2.6.2
To do prognostics work, there is a need to identify a measureable precursor to 
degradation. Using the pattern or trend of degradation and statistics of failure 
for that component, a benchmark can be created to guide the analyses. For 
better approximation, probability theory is added on to calculate the remaining 
useful life for the component under study. A relation between prognostic level 
and failure rate indicates the relevancy of applying prognostics work, which 
means prognostics are encouraged to be done for higher level of electronics 
with high failure rate. After identifying the probability theory to be used for this 
prognostic methodology, the next step is to identify measurable precursor to 
failure without knowing the physics of failure of the component chosen. As such, 
looking at the component as a black box, which means analysing the 
component overall is a solution. True enough, without knowing every detail of 
parts and components in a system, predicting its life time is not an easy task. 
Previous researchers have used particle filter algorithm, and many have used 
artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm but not many have succeeded in showing 
they have successfully applied to avionic systems as a whole in order to predict 
its remaining useful life.  
 Prognostics in avionics 2.6.3
Avionics systems combine physical processes, computational hardware, and 
software systems, and present unique challenges to performing root cause 
analysis when faults occur, and also for establishing the effects of faults on 
overall system behaviour and performance. However, systematic analysis of 
these conditions is very important for analysis of safety and also to avoid 
catastrophic failures in navigation systems. 
This drives the need for integrated prognostics and health management 
technologies for flight-critical avionics equipment. Flight and ground crews 
require accurate health state estimates of these critical avionics components, 
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including accurate detection of faults and prediction of time to the functional 
failure of the avionics system. An understanding of how components degrade is 
needed as well as the capability to anticipate failures and predict the remaining 
useful life of electronic components.  
Studying and analysing the degradation of these systems in example 
degradation in performance to improve aircraft reliability, assure in-flight 
performance, and reduce maintenance costs, therefore it is absolutely 
necessary to provide system health awareness for electronics systems. In 
addition to this, an understanding of the behaviour of deteriorated components 
is needed as well as the capability to anticipate failures and predict the 
remaining life of electronics systems. 
Some of earlier efforts in diagnostic health monitoring of electronic 
systems and subsystems involved the use of a built-in test (BIT), defined as an 
on-board hardware software diagnostic tests to identify and locate faults. 
Studies conducted by on the use of BITs for fault identification and diagnostics 
showed that they can be prone to false alarms and may result in unnecessary 
costly replacement, re-qualification, delayed shipping, and loss of system 
availability.  
The persistence of such issues over the years is perhaps because the 
use of BIT has been restricted to low-volume systems. In general, BITs 
generally have not been designed to provide prognostics or remaining useful life 
due to accumulated damage or progression of faults. Rather, it has served 
primarily as a diagnostic tool. 
According to Lou et al. (LOU et al., 2009) airborne equipment failures are 
divided into two kinds, which are mechanical fatigue and chemical failure. 
These two kinds are closely affected by the environment where equipment is 
installed. However, for most aircraft platforms the precise and individual 
parameters such as temperature or humidity issues are normally intermittent. 
NFF could happen as a result of tracking boards which disappears when the 
boards are dried up.  
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Last but not least, the miniaturization and complexity of electronic integrated 
circuits (IC) nowadays has remarkably challenged the reliability of technicians to 
assess the degradation of electronics from the initial beginning of the design 
process. Even though the integration of circuits has led to the development of 
precise and accurate techniques for reliability estimation, limited information is 
available for predicting the entire health over a wide range of environmental and 
operational life cycle conditions. 
2.7 Forecasting methodology 
The fundamentals in forecasting methodology are models and methods. Models 
can be described as mathematical representations of reality and are usually 
approximate rather than exact. Models are designed to describe the overall 
framework used to portray reality using mathematical functions. Methods on the 
other hand are rules or formulas for computing predictions from observed data. 
So, methodology is not a model, but can be based on a model. This study is 
based on the approach of developing a method based on a model that 
represents the failure trend of an avionic airborne equipment system. In 
forecasting, the types of execution are divided in three classifications, which 
are: the ‘subjective, univariate or multivariate,’ the ‘automatic or non-automatic’ 
and the ‘qualitative or the quantitative’. In the first technique of classification 
(subjective, univariate or multivariate), subjective technique uses judgement, 
intuition, commercial knowledge or any other relevant information in order to 
forecast. It is largely based on educated guesses. These can sometimes 
depend upon past data if available. Normally, these techniques are relatively 
hard to reproduce. It is because; it is very unlikely that the data is shown 
explicitly how it is embedded in the system. Univariate on the other hand 
forecasts by fitting a given variable based on a model of past observations of 
the given time series. Time series are data that is represented in an orderly 
pattern or sequence. For example, extrapolation of trend curves, exponential 
smoothing, the Holt-Winters forecasting procedure, the Box-Jenkins procedure 
and stepwise auto regression. In this technique, the function form and 
coefficient are not known and thus needed to be determined. Ordinarily, it can 
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be obtained from historical data. Lastly, multivariate technique is a technique of 
forecasting a given variable on values of one or more series called explanatory 
variables. This method is sometimes called causal models. Some examples of 
this technique are multiple regressions and econometric models. 
Forecasting methods can also be classified according to automatic versus non-
automatic approach. This is similar to open and closed loop in control systems. 
Non-automatic refers to an open system and automatic depends on feedback, 
similar to a closed loop system. Automatic type of forecasting method does not 
use any human intervention while the other (non-automatic) applies to 
subjective intervention.  Surely, the automatic system gives an added 
advantage as output can be updated in real-time. But it all depends upon, many 
factors such as how forecast is to be used, type of time series involved, number 
of samples observed, duration of forecasting period, skills and experience of 
observer, and others.  
Lastly, forecasting can be divided into qualitative (subjective) and quantitative 
(Abraham and Ledolter, 2009). Normally, quantitative methods are often given 
priority and placed in greater reliance than qualitative method although they 
cannot be domineering or allowed to be the dominating technique. Qualitative 
data is also perceived as lagged behind in some application in the past years. 
However, with the development of state of the art tools and software, qualitative 
methods include simplified indicators so that they are accepted more widely. 
Qualitative is subjective in nature and is based on intuition. It may or may not 
depend on past data. Although it is a non-rigorous approach, it is appropriate 
and reasonable method for some application. Unlike qualitative, quantitative is 
based on mathematical model or statistical model. It can be reproduced by any 
forecaster and is suitable for word problems needing numerical representation. 
The advantage of qualitative method is that it can track mutual influences by 
putting numbers to a particular statement or forecast. Besides, it can represent 
real time monitoring when it is applied in dynamic models. One other advantage 
is that, using quantitative method, it is possible to manipulate information 
consistently, and in a reproducible manner. This can be done through figures, 
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combining figures, and also by examining and comparing data. With numbers, it 
allows for greater precision as compared to merely analysis of increasing and 
decreasing relationship. However, its application is limited in some areas 
whereby, not all factors can be represented numerically but can be done in 
matrices or rubric. Quantitative techniques can be classified by deterministic or 
probabilistic. Deterministic models the relationship between the variable of 
interest, Y and explanatory or predictor variable, X1, X2, X3. This way, the 
outcome is exactly determined. These models only assume a constant failure 
rate but breakdown quickly when the systems go into actual service. It happens 
on the account of multimode environmental forces that brings about part 
failures. Part failure can also occur due to the fact that stress management 
during handling and assembly is not always practiced in a consistent manner.  
Deterministic forecast can be made perfect with the skills of interpreting to the 
degree of forecast models and how good these models are at estimating. This 
will also depend on the precision and accuracy of the observation done at the 
initial stage to produce the model. In deterministic forecasts, through 
observations, diagnosis is presented. Next, appropriate model is applied and 
lastly, prognosis is formed. It is based on the logic concept of ‘if and only if’. 
Probabilistic (stochastic) method measures movement from the present state to 
the future state. It is a technique which relies on different methods to achieve an 
event with a given weightage of probability. Instead of giving definitive 
information on the magnitude of event occurrence, probabilistic technique uses 
uncertainty of prediction based on frequency or pattern of event occurrence. 
In application to this study, a useful and acceptable way forward is to 
understand how the parts fail and then determine how one can prevent that 
from happening prematurely or in a dangerous manner, and establish what can 
be considered to be a useful working lifespan. It is normal to consider 
uncertainty in forecasting since no one estimation is definite, for sure. Because 
forecasting, estimation, prediction and prognosis relate to events happening in 
the future, it must be presented such that the results establish an ‘educated 
guess’ and not simply a wild guess. Thus, in bringing the methodology together, 
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accumulation of ensemble of forecasts with clear and precise model needs to 
be compiled before value of the subjective probability estimates can be 
adhered. Basically, when forecasting methodology topics are discussed the 
main goal is to develop method subjectively in producing an objective outcome 
with a precise and accurate model in the background.  
With few avionic systems that last ten to 20 years in service without difficulty, it 
is important to know that most aircraft operate for a period far longer than that. 
The period of useful life for different components and subsystems can vary 
significantly and the period when the hazard rate is increasing can be difficult to 
pinpoint. Hardware in this phase of life may have intermittent and differing 
causes of failure that are hard to isolate and wear out mechanisms can be 
complex and may exhibit different failure modes. This condition may account for 
some avionic units sometimes called "a rogue unit." 
2.8 Emerging prognostics approaches 
Proper methodology must be chosen for suitable application for it will affect the 
effectiveness of analysis and study projected. Prognostic methodology remains 
a critical yet unknown area to major areas of research. Proper methodology 
must be chosen for suitable application for it will affect the effectiveness of 
analysis and study projected. Another aspect to optimisation of prognostics is 
analysing how the system functions and how it fails. A way to model this is by 
understanding functional behaviour and operation of the system.  All in all, when 
discussing about prognostics, either material degradation or functional 
deterioration which affect system operation is important. For avionics, 
prognostics focuses on the functional deterioration of system and should be 
able to predict one of the following: 
 Remaining Useful Life (RUL): the amount of time, in terms of operating 
hours, cycles, or other measures, the component will continue to meets 
its design specification.  
 Time of Failure (TOF): the time a component is expected to fail (no 
longer meet its design specifications).  
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 Probability of Failure (POF): the failure probability distribution of the 
component. 
This is largely due to the fact that there are limitations to predicting the future. 
Predicting, or sometimes referred as forecasting study is an important activity in 
our daily life. Forecasting methods can be divided into many categories, but 
generally it can be either point forecast or interval forecast. In this study of 
electronic airborne equipment system, it is the aim of the study to develop a 
method to estimate the remaining useful life of the system. Coble used 
parameter features such as trendability, monotonicity, and prognosability 
(2010). These features are used to determine the most useful method for 
individual prognostics case. He classified three categories of methodology 
which are reliability-based, stressor-based and degradation-based. Reliability-
based considers merely historical time to failure data, stressor-based takes the 
environment condition into consideration, and degradation-based monitors how 
specific a component reacts for its specific usage. 
Because prognostic methodology is related to reliability, it is therefore 
significant to identify the reliability prediction for application of specified field. 
Specific application uses different procedural method for their prediction method 
in the reliability analysis. This is because the society or association in the field 
has produced a standard, common ground in order to set the benchmark for 
reliability for each field of study. For example, the military uses Military 
Handbook 217 (MIL-HDBK 217), as a mechanism for estimating probability of 
failure for electronics, whereas the automotive industries use the Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE) reliability prediction method for their reliability 
studies. Table 2-6 lists several reliability prediction methods for different 
application. 
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Table 2-6: Reliability prediction method in variety of application 
Procedural Method Application 
MIL-HDBK-217 Military 
Telcordia SR-322 Telecom 
RDF-93 and 2000 Civil equipment 
SAE reliability prediction method Automotive  
Siemens SN29500 Siemens products 
BT-HRD-5 Telecom 
PRISM Aeronautical & military 
FIDES Aeronautical & military 
Typically, failure prediction methods are examined through a mathematical 
model, so that the state of equipment can be predicted using some series of 
historical information. Prognostic methodology is generally divided into four 
main sections, which are model-based, statistical, data driven and probability 
based. Figure 2-5, shows the generic prognostic method that is currently used 
in many different practices. 
 
Figure 2-5: Prognostic methods at a glance 
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 Model-based methodology 2.8.1
Referring to ‘Mathematical Formulation of model based methods for diagnostics 
and prognostics’ by (Jaw and Wang, 2006) the model based approach is more 
favourable since it provides a more accurate estimation and that it can link 
naturally to the physics of failure. Particle filter (PF) has been widely applied by 
many researchers as a method for failure prognostics (Orchard and 
Vachtsevanos, 2007). They have implemented PF for finding time-to-failure 
estimation for crack growth analysis. Some of the advantages listed for these 
particular methods are that compared to classical Monte-Carlo method, 
sequential importance sampling enables PF to reduce number of samples 
required to approximate the distribution and at the same time, makes the 
process faster and more computational efficient. Besides, PF allows information 
from different sources of measurement to be combined together, systematically. 
For example, Abbas et al. (2007) have used the same approach in identifying 
the underlying conditional state probability and use the Particle Filter estimation 
methods for prediction and filtering. As described in his paper, the underlying 
methodology is the approximation of the conditional state probability distribution 
by a swarm of points referred as particles containing a set of weights 
representing discrete probability masses. Particles can be easily generated and 
recursively updated given a nonlinear process model and a set of available 
measurements and an initial estimation for the state pdf, as below: 
)|(),( 11   kkkkkk xxpxfx   (Equation 2-1) 
)|(),( kkkkkk xzpvxhz   (Equation 2-2) 
 where xk is the state of the fault dimension, the parameters involved that are 
represented by ωk and vk are the noise, and fk and gk are non-linear functions. 
The method was applied to the problem of battery grid corrosion where 
algorithm developed was used to determine the probability of time-to-failure. 
Particle filter model was used to predict time evolution of fault condition-based 
on typical automobile pattern.  
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2.8.1.1 Advantages and drawbacks 
The main advantages of using model-based method are that it can detect 
unanticipated faults and it is highly accurate provided that enough useful 
features are extracted. Because this method models the true system even with 
few data, it can produce high reliability results. However, it tends to be 
computationally prohibitive when applied at system level. This is because one 
needs to fully understand interaction and dependencies of system in order to 
build the model correctly. As white noise is propagated at each level, this 
method tends to also produce large sum of error. Some product usage profile is 
often predictable but is not always reliable. This method also relies on 
continuous physical model of a component.  
 Statistical methodology 2.8.2
Statistical-based method is the simplest and useful method, provided that a 
large history data is available. It is useful where component prognostic models 
are not warranted due to low level of criticality or low failure occurrence rates 
(Roemer et al., 2006). Although simple, it can be valuable for maintenance 
scheduling for electrical or airframe components that have very few sensed 
parameters. In this case, it is not critical enough to go through the process of 
developing a physics- based model. Harun (Harun, 1998) have used statistical 
analysis in determining failure rates for confirmed and unconfirmed removals of 
parts for Malaysia Airlines System (MAS). The work done was to identify the 
most efficient time for maintaining a component. Another example where this 
method is most effective is when failure rate data is easily accessible and can 
be correlated with specific profile usage, which is predicted to have effects on 
the failure. 
2.8.2.1 Advantages and drawbacks 
Using this method, its advantage is that it is workable with small sample size, 
thus allowing a cost effective component testing. It can also provide useful and 
simple graphs. Even in the latest technologies, failure mechanism is 
represented more using Weibull (extensively used in many aeronautical 
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applications). Weibull distribution is widely used in life data analysis due to its 
versatility and relative simplicity. The most general expression of the Weibull pdf 
is given by the three-parameter Weibull distribution expression: 
 
(Equation 2-3) 
Where: 
 
and: 
 β is the shape parameter, also known as the Weibull slope 
 η is the scale parameter 
 γ is the location parameter 
Depending on the values of the parameters, the Weibull distribution can be 
used to model a variety of life behaviours. An important aspect of the Weibull 
distribution is how the values of the shape parameter, β, and the scale 
parameter, η, affect such distribution characteristics as the shape of the pdf 
curve, the reliability and the failure rate. 
This also proves to be more representative for future LRU. The inadequacy in 
using this method is that most data are provided with the restrictive assumption 
of a constant hazard rate function. 
 Data-driven methodology 2.8.3
Primarily used in the clinical trials and medical field, the Cox's regression, also 
known as the proportional hazards model, can be explicitly modelled by means 
of a probabilistic survival function. Cox regression analysis can be analysed 
through time to event occurring. For example, set = p(T > t), the probability that 
the patient survives more than t years. If mortality is the outcome variable, then 
one speaks of survival analysis. If F(t) =1- S(t), and J(t) = F'(t) is the first 
derivative of the distribution function F, then the concept of hazard, defined as 
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h(t) = J(t) / S(t), gives the instantaneous risk of demise after time t. Logistic 
regression and Cox's regression are multivariate statistical regression methods 
(Uckun et al. 2008). Because this research is about monitoring failure 
occurrences, survival time using Cox’s regression can be used to reflect failure 
events. Another example of data driven method is the state estimation 
techniques such as Kalman filters or other various tracking filters that perform 
the same function. Using this approach, the filter is considered to be a virtual 
sensor, whereby it provides optimal estimation of quantities of interest that may 
not be obvious. It uses knowledge of noise to minimise estimation error 
covariance by Kalman gain. Typically, Kalman filter is implemented using the 
linear system model but can be extended to non-linear model if desired. 
2.8.3.1 Advantages and drawbacks 
Although data driven method of prognostics is able to learn models based on 
empirical values, it requires an extensive fault history data. It is possible that 
this method provides the best solution if large enough data is available for 
analysis. This method uses historical data to automatically learn system 
behaviour and their degradation patterns. It suffers when insufficient or no data 
exist for analysis. 
 Probability-based methodology 2.8.4
Markov Model is used to illustrate a probability based method of prognostics 
that is used to allocate spares in the circumstance of any event when failures 
occur. The Figure 2-6 below shows the Markov model of the failure and repair 
process of a component in the presence and absence of spares. Here, it is 
assumed that the time-to-failure is exponentially distributed. When a component 
fails, it is immediately replaced with a spare if a spare is available, otherwise, 
additional spares will need to be procured. One disadvantage of using the 
Markov model is that as the states gets more complex, it get really tedious in 
solving the Markov model vector since the number of states in the Markov 
model usually grows exponentially with the number of system components. 
However, it is quite good for application where only the behavioural events are 
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needed to be analysed and not the real physical system. Nevertheless, with the 
use of software simulation, the Markov model should not be that complicated to 
implement. 
 
Figure 2-6: Component level availability model (Fang Tu et al., 2007) 
2.8.4.1 Advantages and drawbacks 
In probability-based methodology, which uses historical or sequential data to 
predict future failing, the main disadvantage is that it tends to have ‘diffusion of 
context’ phenomenon which brings context to generalisation. In contrast, the 
main advantage of probability-based analysis is that analysis can be made or 
tested based on probable outcomes. The common probability method will be 
elaborated in the next section. 
 Bathtub curve and constant failure rate 2.8.5
The bathtub curve is common when discussing reliability issues. A typical 
bathtub curve can be represented as shown in Figure 2-7.  
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Figure 2-7: Typical bathtub curve used in reliability 
Early method in reliability prediction uses constant failure rate (CFR) and 
reliability distribution using exponential. MIL-HDBK 217, which is the “Reliability 
Prediction of Electronic Equipment”, is a military handbook. It has been so-
called the industry standard for many years and uses CFR as its basis in 
reliability prediction. CFR has been used for many years and until now it has 
presented the basis of any true model as the physics of failure data is much 
harder to get hold of. Thus, it is still valid to consider using failure rate in the 
research as data that is obtained from the maintenance industry are still 
assuming constant failure rate to a certain extent (White, 2008). Airborne 
avionics systems apply the bathtub curve (LOU et al., 2009) which relates 
failure probability and time as shown in Figure 2-7. However, with electrical and 
electronic components that are ever-present to deal with, most semiconductors 
are said to have no short term wear out phase. This means, that the curve 
remain relatively flat as shown in the middle phase. It refers to useful life stage 
failure rate that is constant.  
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Constant failure rate usage in research is disputable. However, that has been 
the foundation stage for any process as true model based, physics of failure 
data is really hard to get. Failure data is commercially sensitive in the sense that 
if the rate is high, consumers will lose their trust in the product. That is why most 
manufacturers prefer to keep it confidential. Moreover, very few failure 
mechanisms have an established failure signature (Hecht, 2006).Thus, this 
‘forces’ academicians to use whatever resources available such as online data 
and product specifications with failure rate numbers attached. This is because 
in normal consequences, reliability data will be published. 
2.9 Overview of methodology 
The methodologies used in this prognostics studies are threefold; the model-
based method, the data-driven based method, and the hybrid method that 
combines both model-based and data-driven methods. Since a prognostic 
research involves estimation and prediction, statistical and probabilistic studies 
cannot be totally excluded. Thus, it is equally important to also consider 
statistical method and probabilistic elements in this research. Take a weather 
forecast as an example, to forecast tomorrow’s weather, information must be 
known beforehand. In doing so, initial data has to be collected or certain pattern 
of weather forecast needs to be established. Otherwise, there must be a certain 
model that can be used to predict the weather. It could be by looking at the wind 
direction, or the moisture level and even the location of the clouds. Similarly, in 
forecasting the failure of aircraft equipment, several procedures are established. 
Firstly, historical data are collected. This will be the starting point that acts as 
the benchmark. Data is then analysed through models. Prognostic methodology 
model is developed to assist in estimating time-to-failure.  
In this research, the mathematical model of this methodology employs the 
Markov Model and Cox’s regression analysis incorporating well-known reliability 
standards which are common for space and military use. Various numerical 
methods for efficient and accurate solving of the model equations are 
presented, which enables reliable predictive simulation of the underlying 
physical phenomena. The simulation results are compared with the 
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corresponding field data results and checked on their physical soundness. 
Details on the performance of the algorithm developed will be shown in later 
chapters. 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter has identified the research gap from the past researches that can 
be filled by this study. Through this chapter, trends of methods and application 
in the current practise can be seen. Besides the emerging methodologies, the 
advantages of applying prognostics methodology in the avionics context has 
been presented. An in-depth discussion on the methodology used for this 
research will be covered in the next chapter. 
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  CHAPTER 3
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 3
This chapter illustrates the steps that put this research in entirety. It brings 
together the process of achieving the objectives in fulfilling the aim of this study. 
This chapter will tell the reader the framework and structure of the avionic 
prognostics methodology. Each functional module reflecting the objectives of 
the avionics prognostics system will be thoroughly explained in this chapter.  A 
pictorial representation of the whole process in given in the Figure 3-1: 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Problem Identification
Literature study
Development of prognostics 
methodology
Development of prognostics 
algorithm
Validation using case studies
Discussion and conclusion
 
Figure 3-1: General steps of the research methodology 
3.1 Problem identification 
The early stage of this research was to identify issues relating to prognostics 
approach and how can it contribute to the current situation. The research has 
been narrowed down to prognostics application on avionics at system level due 
to the reason that most discussions have neglected this area of study. This 
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particular research is aimed at exploring and developing prognostics 
methodology for airborne avionics system. 
3.2 Literature study 
Along with the aim, the literature study provides evidence on the importance of 
conducting the research. An extensive literature review has been carried out to 
enable a decision on the right methodology and approach to be chosen for LRU 
level prognostics application. Literature study was done continuously throughout 
this duration of study and is considered the most fundamental step in achieving 
the aim and objectives of this study. 
 Steps in literature study 3.2.1
a. Searching for literature 
b. Sorting and prioritising the retrieved literature 
c. Analytical reading of papers 
d. Evaluative reading of papers 
e. Comparison across studies 
f. Organising the content 
g. Writing the review 
3.3 Development of prognostics methodology 
In this research, the discussion on prognostics methodology is divided into two 
main sections: 
 The general view 
 The integrated methodology view 
In general, the prognostics methodology will discuss the fundamental need for 
prognostics work. The process flow of this methodology is shown in the Figure 
3-2:  
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Start
System selection
Collecting data & 
information
Condition 
monitoring 
technique selection
Condition 
assessment and 
fault diagnostic
Accepted
Condition based 
maintenance task
accepted
 
Figure 3-2: General process flow for prognostics based on condition-based 
maintenance 
Identification and selection of condition parameters are necessary to ensure 
prognostics success. Only measureable parameters and parameters that could 
be monitored to define their condition or performance are to be chosen. These 
condition parameters can be defined as a measureable variable that enables to 
be displayed directly or reflect indirect information about the condition of an item 
at any particular instance. In practise, there are two distinguishable types of 
condition parameters which are the relevant condition indicator (RCI) and the 
relevant condition predictor (RCP). The RCI is a parameter that describes the 
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condition of an item during its operating time and indicates the condition at the 
instant of inspection. The RCP on the other hand, describes the condition of an 
item at every instant of operating time. The difference between these two 
conditions is that the RCI is usually related to the performance at the point of 
inspection and not able to predict the future development of the considered 
system. RCP on the other hand, represents the condition of the system which is 
most likely to be affected by a gradual deterioration failure such as wear and 
crack growth (Kumar et. al, 2012). 
The methodology includes several approaches such as Markov model theory, 
statistical analysis, mathematical model known as MTBF (Mean Time between 
Failures) and MTBUR (Mean Time between Unscheduled Repair) equations, 
and Cox’s regression analysis that will be integrated in the final stage. Given the 
input such as in Figure 3-3, the specific results of prognostics methodology can 
be achieved. For example, if fault tree and failure rate are given or known, 
Markov Modelling can be used to determine the probability of failure at any level 
of analysis. As such, time to failure can be compared with the established 
failure rate by the OEM. Because prognostics study focuses on the importance 
of time in maintenance, all these approaches will involve the time factor. At the 
end of these processes, these outputs will then be synchronised using the 
temperature-failure rate model to calculate the probability of failure at different 
operating temperatures. 
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Figure 3-3: Prognostics methodology design process 
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Figure 3-4: The integrated view of prognostics methodology  
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Figure 3-4 shows the overall prognostics methodology developed to find the 
time to failure in an LRU. It will be elaborated further in the sections that follow. 
 Degradation  3.3.1
In this part of the study, degradation trend analysis at system level was done by 
gathering data from airlines. Data includes component removal information with 
dates, types of aircraft, airlines, flight hours and ATA chapter description. In 
doing the analysis for dependency trends at LRU level in airborne avionic 
system, fault tree diagram with failure rate relationship was used.  
 Failure rate data 3.3.2
Failure rate data is used and produced at different stages of this research 
depending on the availability of information. In particular, failure rate data will be 
used in the three stages of prognostics methodology developed. First, it will be 
used in the Markov model process where failure rate is essential for simulating 
using the procedures developed. The failure rate dependencies within different 
equipment pooled for single failure rate for overall LRU will be calculated. 
Secondly, MTBF and MTBUR calculation are analysed, and failure rate is 
established. Thirdly, it will be used in the regression analysis of failure rate and 
temperature dependency analysis. 
 Time to failure prediction 3.3.3
Finally, all the information gathered and calculated will be integrated with the 
environmental (temperature) versus failure rate model to produce the time to 
failure prediction. 
 Reliability prediction 3.3.4
In this research, reliability prediction used is closely related to application of 
reliability theories such as probability of failure, MTBF, MTBUR, MTTF and 
failure rate. Reliability prediction was conducted to identify the relationship of 
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the field data and the common known variables, and is a common methodology 
where prediction of failure is concerned. The intended results of this process 
are to fill in the gap of knowledge and to verify that the developed methodology 
works well. 
3.4 Development of prognostics algorithm 
An elaboration on the prognostics algorithm development is based on each 
method. The algorithm shall follow the Figure 3-5: 
 
Figure 3-5: Overall prognostics algorithm development process 
The algorithm starts off by analysing all available data and identifying what 
methods work best. If information on failure rate data is accompanied by the 
fault tree diagram, then Markov modelling can be used. Otherwise, the process 
flow continues to check if the MTBF data is available so statistical inferences 
can be done. If not, the system continues to check if flight hours and number of 
flight records are available. If they are, the MTBF and MTBUR data to compare 
against the OEM benchmark value can be calculated.  
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 Markov-Failure rate module 3.4.1
This algorithm is used to solve probability of failure given the fault tree 
(degradation) and failure rate at each state. With the known data, the probability 
of failure at the top level can be calculated and compared with the OEM’s value. 
Besides, dependencies of components in LRUs can also be figured out using 
the fault tree diagram. The detail of this process is given in the Figure 3-6: 
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Figure 3-6: Algorithm for Markov Modelling 
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 Statistical inferences module 3.4.2
Statistical inferences were used to explore and understand the pattern and 
trend of the removal of components. The result of the study provided insights to 
identify suitable components to explore and determine why the chosen 
component was selected. 
 MTBF and MTBUR module 3.4.3
The input parameters needed for this module represented in Figure 3-7 are: 
 UR – unscheduled removal 
 URY – unscheduled removal for the period of study 
 IU – installed unit 
 FH – flight hours 
 CF – confirmed defect 
i=i+1;
X=UR;
If x=’1'
STOP
MTBUR=(FH*UI)/URY;
MTBF=(FH*UI)/CF
i<imax
No
No
Yes
START
Input parameter:
UR, URY, IU, FH,
Initialize variable :
i=0; CF=0; imax= max(number); 
URY=0
URY=URY+1
If CF=’1'
Yes
CF=CF+1
Yes
No
 
Figure 3-7: MTBF and MTBUR algorithm 
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This module is used to calculate MTBUR and MTBF values for removal data 
provided information of flight hours, confirmed defect, unscheduled removal 
data, and formulas are provided. For this module, the equations to be used to 
calculate MTBUR and MTBF values are: 
 
periodthatduringfailureconfirmedofnumber
aircraftperinstalledunitshoursflightMTBF
______
____ 
  
 
periodthatforremovaldunscheduleofnumber
aircraftperinstalledunitshoursflightMTBUR
______
____ 
  
 Cox Proportional Hazard analysis module 3.4.4
For Cox proportional hazards model incorporate the effects of covariates which 
will be temperature and stress on failure rate values. Proportional hazards 
assumption will be: 
h(t;x,β) = h0(g(x,β) 
where  
h(t) and h0(t) represents the failure rate;  
x represents the covariates; and  
β is the coefficient estimates. 
Generally, four steps will be needed for this feature to be included in analysis. 
 Step 1: Load sample data 
 Step 2: Find the coefficient estimates 
 Step 3: Add temperature and stress as covariates to the model 
 Step 4: Analyse model for outcome 
3.5 Validation using case studies of real field data 
For validation, a case study is used. The selection of avionics system to be 
used as a case study is determined to fulfil the effectiveness and the need for 
prognostics application on such system. Thus, it must affect the safety, 
 75 
reliability and maintainability of the aircraft that the system employed. For that, 
the Terrain Avoidance Warning System was chosen as a case study. This 
decision was also based on the trend of removal, which has been identified to 
be amongst the most crucial, where improvement is needed.  
 Approach to identify suitable avionics equipment  3.5.1
In order to identify and evaluate the suitable avionics equipment to be applied 
with prognostic techniques, a large and diverse research of the component data 
was required. First, this thesis will focus on avionics systems installed in general 
transport aircraft. The application of avionics systems and components to be 
analysed are randomly selected from the maintenance manual. Next, the 
selected avionics systems are extracted into two main categories that are 
communication and navigation. The categorized avionics systems will be 
evaluated into several criteria to identify whether or not the systems or 
components are worthy of prognostics studies or vice versa. The factors for 
considering if systems are prognostics worthy are cost, operation, logistics or 
replacement issues and lastly the maintainability of the system or equipment as 
summarised in Figure 3-8. 
 
Figure 3-8: Avionics metrics parameter 
•identify the 
availability of 
the components
•study the 
troubleshooting 
methods 
available
•prioritize 
operation and 
technical 
background
•identify cost 
efficiency
Cost 
effectiveness
Operation 
wise
Logistics
Maintenance 
& 
maintainability
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3.5.1.1 Cost-effectiveness 
Cost effectiveness is an economic metric that measures the average cost to 
repair a component during a year.  Theoretically, cost effectiveness decreases 
initially as repair sources advance up the learning curve and develop more 
efficient processes based on previous repairs.  But as components age, repair 
costs will increase in real dollars. Factors affecting these increases include 
lower repair volume, diminishing repair sources, more expensive replacement 
parts, and more expensive test equipment maintenance costs.  Measurement of 
this metric is the easiest with outsourced vendors who charge a service fee for 
each repair, whereas organic repair costs can be difficult to track if cost pools 
are not sufficiently separated. 
This metric can be used to estimate the future component life-cycle costs for 
use in return on investment calculations in order to determine when component 
repair will become cost prohibitive.  The time that component repair becomes 
cost prohibitive represents the end of a component’s life cycle due to economic 
considerations.  In addition, this metric is also useful for determining the short-
term estimate of repair budget. 
3.5.1.2 Operation 
This metric describes the operation of the avionics system and how critical it is 
in ensure the reliability and availability of the aircraft is achieved. This metrics 
portray the knowledge of the system and demonstrates how the equipment 
operates in real life. The priority of the avionics system to be prognosed is 
greatly dependent on the criticality of the equipment in order for the aircraft to 
be airworthy. Besides that, as the knowledge operation of the equipment is 
achieved, it is easy to differentiate the criticality each of the systems towards 
flight safety. 
3.5.1.3 Logistics for availability 
This is a sustainability metric that measures the percentage of components in 
stock that are required to be in stock due to an allowance list.  This metric is 
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also referred to as stock age rate or supply rate, and can have several methods 
of measurement, any of which can be used in the model. 
System availability actually measures a state, such as an end of the month 
snapshot, as opposed to a rate or flow.  For example, if there were ten 
operating sites that each has an allowance of four components, a supply of 40 
units at the end of the month would equal 100% availability.  This measurement 
would be difficult to measure continuously in real time over the course of the 
month.  However, the average of the 12 monthly measurements would be a 
suitable yearly entry into the model. 
This metric measures the ability of the repair system to provide an adequate 
supply of operable components, but there are some inherent shortcomings to 
this measure.  For one, since a goal of 100% is neither obtainable nor desired, it 
is difficult to determine a suitable goal.  Also, if 50% is measured during one 
month, it could be due to ten users having two out of four components available, 
or it could be due to five users having no components available at all.  
Therefore, this metric does not track the distribution of the availability very well. 
Recent efforts have sought to reduce the capital tied up in large stockpiles of 
repairable parts, at operating units, by reducing repair pipeline cycle times and 
transportation delivery times.  Both of these efforts have decreased required on-
site supply needs.  But if a component is experiencing sustainment difficulties, 
such as diminishing repair sources and stocks of piece-parts, obsolete test 
equipment, and high scrap rates, availability will decline.  The increase in repair 
pipeline and supply cycle time will prompt an increase in allowance limits that 
will reduce availability even further. This can however be improved if the 
procedure of AOG was properly used and could supersede issues discussed.  
3.5.1.4 Maintenance and maintainability  
Maintenance optimization is a process that attempts to find the best balance of 
the maintenance requirements (contractual, economics, technical, etc.) and the 
resources used to carry out the maintenance program (people, spares, 
consumables, equipment, facilities, etc.). When the maintenance optimization is 
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effectively implemented, it will improve system availability, reduce overall 
maintenance cost, improve equipment reliability, and improve system safety.  In 
the former case, optimization is performed to choose the option that generates 
the largest cost avoidance and maximizes the availability for an individual 
system. In the latter, optimization is performed to choose the optimal 
subsystems to be maintained and meet availability at the enterprise level. 
The maintenance efficiency of systems is an important economic and 
commercial issue. Main difficulties are resulted from the choice of maintenance 
actions. A bad choice can lead to maintenance with a cost overrun that is not 
acceptable. Because of the increase of involved technologies (pieces of 
hardware, software) and the different interactions between components 
(communications by message passing or physical interactions), the decision of 
a maintenance action is very complex and requires a diagnostic and prognostic 
analysis. Maintaining such a system basically consists in replacing components 
that are unable to perform their function by new ones.  
Maintenance activities are costly for several reasons. The first one is that they 
usually require stopping the system that cannot be used anymore during the 
maintenance phase. The longer the maintenance phase is, the more costly it is. 
It follows that the maintenance phase must be reduced to the strict minimal 
operation that is the replacement of the correct components. This requires that 
the maintenance actions must be decided relying on an efficient and complete 
analysis of the health of the system when it is operating. The second reason of 
a high cost in maintenance is in cases of emergency. If a component suddenly 
fails and the system fully breaks down, it automatically requires some 
unscheduled maintenance actions, which are more costly than scheduled 
maintenance. To partly avoid this issue, prognostic methods are used in order 
to perform preventive maintenance. Preventive maintenance basically involves 
replacing components during a scheduled maintenance phase that are not yet 
faulty but that will inevitably become faulty before the date of the next scheduled 
maintenance phase. 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter details out the methodology chosen for this study and provides 
understanding to the reader on why the steps of methodology were identified 
and used in the study. In the next chapter, theoretical work on the study will be 
presented. 
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  CHAPTER 4
 RUL PREDICTION METHODS IN 4
LRUs 
This chapter aims to provide a systematically developed fundamental theory of 
the research models based on the study done in the earlier chapters. The 
Remaining Useful Life Prediction methods involved in carrying out this research 
will also be provided in this chapter.  It will include both the RUL prediction 
methods for LRUs and LRMs as well as the RUL prediction methods for 
airborne avionics system. The proposed prognostics algorithm of the 
prognostics system will be further evaluated through the development of 
software simulation system.  
4.1 Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis is a failure based study that includes logic and probabilistic 
techniques. This application, which was popular in the sixties, is particularly 
preferred in manuals and instruction booklet as it is straightforward and clear. It 
is a qualitative approach but can be quantified when probabilistic risk 
assessment is added. Thus it becomes a mixed approach. It has become a 
useful methodology in system safety assessment, where all failure rates are 
presented in logic diagrams. Top events can be easily seen when illustrated in a 
fault tree diagram. With fault tree, a deductive approach is used to conclude 
what events trigger failure to happen. Basically it is a top down approach. The 
process determines the root causes using organised backward steps design, to 
find the underlying solution of the overall failure. The advantage of using this 
method is that it will not only show the low-probability and high consequence 
failure events but it can also show high-probability and near miss events. It is 
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the benign events that are important to detect as high-consequence failures can 
blow up when are not detected early. Fault tree uses logic diagrams such as the 
AND gate and OR gate as in Figure 4-1 in order to describe the input and 
output events. This relation of fault tree is commonly associated with flight hour 
and thus possible to find the mean time to failure when the failure rate is known. 
 
Figure 4-1: AND and OR gate used Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
4.2 Markov model 
Markov model is a stochastic process that involves a probabilistic mathematical 
model, which involves time, and its outcome only depends on the present state. 
This means, the next state outcome is only influenced by the preceding state. 
Since Markov model can be used as discrete or continuous processes with 
regards to time, it has been used in many areas of reliability. A Markov model 
consists of two variables, which are state and time. Normally, Markov is 
represented in the form of state transition diagram as shown in the Figure 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-2: State transition diagram 
State 0 State 1 
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As shown, a component with two states, normal state and fail state would have 
this as its state diagram or transition diagram. The transition rate is described 
by the failure rates in this study. The one-step transition probabilities can be 
condensed into a transition probability matrix P, where 
P ij= ൤P଴଴ Pଵ଴P଴ଵ Pଵଵ൨  (Equation 4-1) 
The following are some important properties about Markov model: 
 Since for all i j ∈ S  0 ≤ x ≤1 and each row in P adds up to 1, matrix P is a 
stochastic matrix. 
 The probability mass function of the random value  P(0) is called the 
initial probability row-vector 
 X(0)= [X0(0),X1(0),…Xn(0)] and presents the initial condition of Markov 
Chain. 
 If P is the state transition matrix, and X is the state probability in 
exponential Markov chain then X’(t)=X(t).P 
For Markov distribution model, for a given the initial distribution X(0), the 
following can be determined. 
 X(1)=X(0).P 
 X(2)=X(1).P = X(0).P.P = X(0).P2 
Thus, for any k, 
 X(k)= X(0). Pk and elements of P must satisfy the following conditions: 
 ∑ P୧୨ =୨ି୬୨ିଵ   1 for all I (row sum) and Xij≥0 for all i and j. 
The dynamic nature of system is modelled as the Markov state model. The 
Markov model provided prognostic measures, such as the time to reach a faulty 
state, along with the probability of reaching this state. The Markov model allows 
the system to go back to their previous state and there is then no need to 
consider unidirectional system progress because electronic products do not 
experience failure due to wear out mechanisms. 
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In Figure 4-3 below, is the GUI for a simple two state markov chain simulation 
which shows the probability of system going into states S1 and S2. X 
represents the initial state distribution and P is the state transition matrix. Figure 
4-4 shows a simulation for a 3-state markov chain where X3 steady shows the 
output when the system stables off (Source code provided in Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 4-3: Two-state Markov Chain Simulation 
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Figure 4-4: Three-state Markov Chaim Simulation 
4.3 Cox regression analysis 
Statistical procedure of Proportional Hazard model is used in identifying 
objective assessments in determining the true health state of a system. Cox 
proportional hazard model on the other hand is a multivariate technique for 
analysing the effect of two or more metric and or non-metric variables on 
survival. Failure condition at repair time is noted and failure time when the 
system cannot perform its function is recorded. Data that will be needed to 
perform this analysis will be system/ LRU fail time, removal due to failure or 
preventive maintenance due to signal of deterioration. Determining the 
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probability of a system will fail given its initial characteristics and evolution over 
time relative to other systems. It also explores the timing of LRU going to failure. 
Therefore, a robust control using actionable information can be used for failure 
prognosis. It is useful when dealing with many covariates, X. The main 
advantage of using proportional hazards model is that analysis can be carried 
out without any assumptions about the distribution and about the form of the 
base line hazard function, h0 (Dale, 1985). Given sample data, that contains two 
or more variables, model of the relationship can be derived between the 
variables.  Next, it is then decided which model best describes the relationship 
between the variable and estimates its accuracy. In order to avoid overly 
optimistic prediction error is by doing cross-validation. That means two sets of 
data are needed, one to build the model and the other to test the model. 
Proportional hazard function is widely used in medical field to perform survival 
time prognostic. It is basically a model free and is a semi parametric model that 
needs no assumption to be made about shapes of time to event distribution. It 
can be used for events that deal with failure time data. Estimation techniques of 
hazard function will be used to predict failure times. Usually failure times are 
modelled by fitting an exponential, Weibull, or lognormal distribution to the data. 
As failure data arise with certain degradation parameter, data of occurrences 
can be used to correlate these two or more variables by gauging the weight 
attributed to each variable respectively. Because this technique allows for both 
metric and non-metric analysis, this method would then be generic enough to 
be applied to a “black-box” system of any kind. 
 Advantages of hazard model 4.3.1
‘Acceleration model’ rather than a specific life distribution model lies in its ability 
to model and test inferences about survival without any prejudgement or 
specific assumption about the form of life distribution model. The real strength 
of this proportional hazard model is that it allows for survival time relationship to 
be modelled through hazard function. Cox’s regression model is a non-
parametric approach to survival data. Users can also incorporate time-varying 
covariates or explanatory variable that change with time. For example, if the 
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system degrades before failing, the hazard model will change and it will be 
revealed in the health of system checks. Explanatory variable or predictors, X 
can be voltage, degradation parameter or others.  
This model interprets the benefits of parametric and semi parametric 
approaches to statistical inferences. Also known as the Cox model, it presumes 
that the ratio of the hazard rate to a baseline hazard rate is an exponential 
function of the parameter vector. 
ߣ(ݐ, ݖ) = ߣ଴	(ݐ)݁ݔ݌	(∑(݆ = 1)^ݍߚ݆		ܺ(݆	)) 
Where z is a vector and β 
(Equation 4-2) 
ℎ(ݐ)
ℎ଴(ݐ) = exp	(ݔᇱܾ) (Equation 4-3) 
ℎ(ݐ)
ℎ଴(ݐ) = exp(ܺᇱܤ) = ݁௕భ௫భା௕మ௫మା...ା௕೛௫೛  (Equation 4-4) 
ℎܽݖܽݎ݀	ݎܽݐ݅݋(ݐ, ݔଵ,ݔ଴) = ℎ(ݐ, ݔଵ,ߚ)ℎ(ݐ,ݔ଴,ߚ)  
ℎܽݖܽݎ݀	ݎܽݐ݅݋	(ݐ,ݔଵ,ݔ଴) = 	 ݁ఉ(௫భି௫బ)  
 
The failure data (part total hour) will be correlated using the equation above 
with	ߣ଴(t) unknown and ߚ unknown. ܺ on the other hand, will be the parameters 
to be studied such as temperature, humidity and vibration. When the hazard is 
logged, the coefficients are called the risk score, represented by β. When β is 
positive, it means that the two variables are positively correlated with higher 
better representing higher correlation. Otherwise, if β is negative, it means the 
opposite. One other method to find β is solving the Partial Likelihood Estimation 
(PLE). PLE can be calculated using the steps below: 
1. Order failure times such that t1<t2<…<tk where ti denotes failure time for 
ith individual 
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2. For censored cases, define it as ‘1’ 
3. Ordered events are then modeled as a function of covariates, x 
4. Take the product of conditional probability of failure at time tt, provided 
the number of cases 
5. The results will then show the probability of the jth case will fail at time T 
Last but importantly, traditional statistical approaches such as regression 
models for survival analysis will be used to correlate environment parameters 
without knowing its distribution. Cox’s proportional hazard model in particular 
was chosen to be used since no assumptions need to be made about the shape 
of time to event distribution (Shyur, 2008). It is also suitable for semi-parametric 
or non-parametric statistical models, which will be used for this study. Cox’s 
regression analysis were mostly used in the medical field, but recently, it has 
also gained popularity in areas such as reliability engineering, finance for 
bankruptcy estimation, transportation and also system failures in general. With 
this model, many parameters can be taken into account, which is considered an 
important section of this research.  
 Advantages and disadvantages of Cox model: 4.3.2
 Provide estimate (statistical technique) of behaviour or condition effect 
on failure time given their prognostic variables. 
 Data needs to be fitted using a mathematical model and final model will 
output a formula for hazard as a function of several explanatory 
variables. 
 To analyse the model, coefficients are examined. Positive coefficient for 
the variable dictates that hazard is higher which then means prognostic 
work is worsening. However, if negative coefficient is shown, it means 
that prognosis is better for the system.  
 The disadvantage of this model is that it only simultaneously explores 
using available data and not directly model based using sensor of any 
type.  
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4.4 Kaplan Meier 
Coit presented a similar way to do reliability prediction. However, the 
demonstration was done with 39 circuit cards with different operating conditions 
(Coit et al., 2005). The end product shows reliability versus time graph as 
shown in Figure 4-3.  
 
Figure 4-5: Reliability chart to determine time to failure (Coit et al., 2005)  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
However, they have assumed that the distribution of sample to be normal. 
Kaplan Meier is a method to estimate the cumulative survival distribution 
without making any distribution assumptions. It has proved to be an excellent 
use for large datasets and provides means to capture the lifetime distribution for 
‘snapshot’ data. An output from the Kaplan Meier method can be shown in 
Figure 4-4. The disadvantage of using this method is it only provides an 
estimate of proportion of population that will survive and not truly accurate. 
However, for a simplistic view, this method seems to be practical. 
Appropriate probabilistic model for time to failure is needed to be constructed 
and parameters need to be estimated so that the information can be suited to 
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predict remaining useful life. Other usage is to establish inventory rules and also 
part replacement programmes. This technique will also help in the reliability 
program for the company. In order for prognostic technology to be applied 
successfully, the economic aspect of it is a priority. Broad prognosis indicator 
being the key identifier to any signature failure can contribute to cost saving 
(Hecht, 2006) . Many different prognostic techniques have been applied such as 
statistical methods, artificial intelligence methods and fuzzy-rule systems 
(Jianhui Luo et al., 2003). Prognostics, while has been established in 
automotive and power-plants, it is still quite new in application where many high 
failure rate parts are dominant with few recognisable failure mode. 
 
Figure 4-6: An example of graph produced using Kaplan Meier method 
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  CHAPTER 5
 TERRAIN AWARENESS AND 5
WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) 
This chapter provides some understandings regarding Terrain Awareness and 
Warning System (TAWS) or sometimes referred to as Enhanced Ground 
Proximity System (EGPWS). The insights of this chapter cover TAWS/EGPWS 
functions and operating modes, TAWS/EGPWS system architecture and 
components, TAWS/EGPWS performance requirements and performance 
degradation pattern. Other than that, main fault mode and failure effects and 
how failure is propagated in the system will be analysed in this chapter. The 
reliability rates and failure rates will also be discussed as it will also be used for 
analysis in the later chapters. 
5.1 Introduction 
“ICAO’s first action in this regard can be traced back to 1978, when 
requirements for equipping commercial air transport aircraft with GPWS were 
introduced in Part I of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention. This led to a 
significant decrease in the number of CFIT occurrences, but not to their 
complete elimination. A further step was taken with the development of GPWS 
with a forward looking terrain avoidance function, generally referred to as 
enhanced GPWS and known in the United States as Terrain Awareness and 
Warning System (TAWS).” 
 -ICAO MODEL REGULATION AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON 
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM (GPWS) 
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Enhanced ground proximity warning system was pioneered by Allied Signal now 
known as Honeywell. The main purpose of EGPWS is to provide basic ground 
proximity warning. Aircraft input such as position, altitude, air speed, glideslope 
and flight plan along with internal terrain and airport database allow EGPWS to 
predict potential conflict between the aircraft’s future flight path and terrain. It is 
also to alert pilots on altitude awareness, excessive bank angle alert, terrain 
clearance, and terrain and obstacle awareness alerts. It is to warn the pilot of 
any inadvertent distance to the ground. It was before the use of enhanced 
ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) that occurrence of controlled-flight-
into-terrain (CFIT) accidents was high. It was intended to reduce the incidents 
happening. These incidents happen with no signs of mechanical failure or fault 
but crashes to ground. These accidents usually occur in conditions of poor 
visibility due to atmospheric obscuration such as fog or rain, or darkness of 
night. Federal aviation regulations (FAR) have required installation of the 
system on large turbine-powered aircraft in commercial service since 1975. 
These system consist of a computer which gets inputs from sensors on aircraft 
and provides warnings to pilot. This is done through visual and aural alerting 
devices.  
The system is designed to detect and warn the pilot of excessive descent rate 
near the ground, excessive terrain closure rate, approaching the ground with 
landing gear or flaps not in the landing configuration, and descending 
significantly below the ILS electronic glideslope when on approach to landing. 
Also, during take-off and immediately after initiating a missed-approach go-
around, the system warns the pilot when the aircraft is descending when it 
should normally be climbing.  
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5.2 Hardware composition of the EGPWS (TAWS) and 
performance requirement of components 
 
Figure 5-1: EGPWS composition 
Figure 5-1 shows the composition on input going in and output leaving EGPWS. 
In the figure, outputs can be shown on the display and also through the voice 
warning for aural sounds. Some of inputs into the system includes reading from 
the radio altimeter, and the GPS integrated with data downloaded through the 
Ethernet and the FMS (flight management system. 
5.3 Functions and operating modes of EGPWS 
It is a system that warns the crew if the aircraft’s current flight path would result 
in impact with the ground. The system is designed to capture the aircraft’s flight 
path with respect to the terrain at all altitudes between 50 and 2450 ft. It uses 
inputs from systems providing radio altitude, air speed (Mach number), landing 
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gear and flap position, and decision height (DH) setting. The system provides 
both visual alert message and aural alert warnings. The various dangerous 
conditions that can be encountered in flight are divided into six modes. They are 
mode 1: Excessive descent rate, mode 2: Excessive terrain closure rate, mode 
3: Loss of altitude after take-off (or go-around) when not in the landing 
configuration, mode 4: Insufficient terrain clearance, mode 5:  Descent below 
ILS glide slope and mode 6: Descent below selected minimum decision height 
(DH).  
Advanced versions of the equipment have additional facilities of radio altitude 
callouts and aural warnings at excessive high bank angles. The other feature in 
these versions is that spurious and nuisance warnings are minimized. The 
system has a major drawback in that it cannot look ahead at terrain but can be 
integrated with a Worldwide Terrain database to give some look ahead 
prediction. However, this would introduce another failure mode which could be 
difficult to test. Consequently, it cannot always give pilots sufficient time to 
predict and plan avoidance manoeuvres. Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS), besides 
providing traditional GPWS alerting functions, displays the surrounding terrain 
(up to 320 NM) on an EFIS (electronic flight instrument system) screen or 
weather radar CRT (cathode-ray tube) and provides alerts about a minute’s 
flight time or more away from terrain.  
5.4 EGPWS system architecture 
The Figure 5-2 shows the functional diagram of an EGPWC, with its inputs and 
outputs from the EGPWC. 
 94 
 
Figure 5-2: Overview of EGPWC and its components 
 Aircraft sensors and other system  5.4.1
The sensors and other system provide input signals to be read into the EGPWC 
for processing. 
 EGPWC 5.4.2
The EGPWC is the heart of the system. It computes and analyses the data 
provided to be fed out to the speakers and interphone. 
 Flight deck audio systems (speakers and interphone) 5.4.3
This is one of the outputs which provide sound alert to warn when necessary. 
 Alert lamps and/or digital outputs to EFIS displays  5.4.4
Lamps and EFIS displays are for alert and system status messages. 
 Weather radar indicator or EFIS displays  5.4.5
Weather radar indicator and EFIS displays provide display of terrain. 
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 Switching relay(s) or display switching unit when required 5.4.6
This unit shows switching display inputs from weather display to terrain display. 
5.5 EGPWS performance degradation 
The EGPWS provides a Self-Test capability for verifying and indicating intended 
functions. This Self-Test capability consists of six levels to aid in testing and 
troubleshooting the EGPWS. These six levels are: 
Level 1 – Go / No Go Test provides an overview of the current operational 
functions and an indication of their status. 
Level 2 – Current Faults provides a list of the internal and external faults 
currently detected by the EGPWC. 
Level 3 – EGPWS Configuration indicates the current configuration by listing 
the EGPWS hardware, software, databases, and program pin inputs detected 
by the EGPWC. 
Level 4 - Fault History provides an historical record of the internal and external 
faults detected by the EGPWC. 
Level 5 - Warning History provides an historical record of the alerts given by 
the EGPWS. 
Level 6 - Discrete Test provides audible indication of any change to a discrete 
input state. 
A level 1 Go/No Go Test is normally performed by flight crews as part of pre-
flight checks. All other levels are typically used for installation checkout and 
maintenance operations. 
5.6 Reliability of EGPWS from product specification 
The EGPWC Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was 
developed using MIL-STD-1629 as a guideline. The EGPWC reliability 
prediction was developed using MIL-HDBK-217F as a guideline. Historical MK 
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V GPWC reliability data and the EGPWC reliability prediction results were used 
as baseline criteria in establishing the following minimum EGPWC Mean Time 
between Failure (MTBF) and Mean Time between Unit Replacement (MTBUR) 
values. MTBF for confirmed failures will be 10,000 flight hours or better, for the 
latest EGPWS configuration three years from initial production delivery. MTBUR 
will be 7,000 flight hours or better, for the latest EGPWS configuration three 
years from initial production delivery. The MKVII EGPWS MTBUR is expected 
to be similar to that of the MKV EGPWS provided proper line troubleshooting 
procedures are followed when diagnosing system failures. 
Historical MK V GPWC as well as recent Enhanced MK V field reliability data 
and MIL-HDBK-217F were used as baseline in establishing the minimum 
EGPWC MTBF and MTBUR values. MTBF values are per operating hours for 
confirmed failures and apply to corresponding latest EGPWC configuration 
three years from Initial Production Delivery (IPD) date. Similarly, MTBUR values 
are per operating hours for justified removals and apply to corresponding latest 
EGPWC configuration three years from IPD date. MTBUR values presume 
proper line troubleshooting procedures are followed when diagnosing system 
failures. 
5.7 Failure rates of EGPWS components 
 Failure rates standard from product specification 5.7.1
Table 6-1 describes the EGPWS failure rate obtained from product specification 
that is used as a standard or benchmark for comparison with EGPWS failure 
rate obtained from field data.  
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Table 5-1: EGPWS LRU failure rate from product specification 
LRU Failure rate MTBF (hours) 
Radio Altimeter 189.5x10-6 5277 
Vertical Gyro 247.6x10-6 4038.8 
Directional Gyro 247.3x10-6 4048.6 
Global Positioning System (GPS) 85.7x10-6 11682 
TAD Inhibit switch 6.37x10-6 156985.9 
TA Display – Weather Radar PPI 227.1x10-6 4403.3 
EGPWC 80x10-6 125000 
 Failure rates from field data 5.7.2
The EGPWS failure rate field data has been obtained from airlines. The 
datasets were obtained from two different data sources in a form of spread 
sheet which contains removal events between 1st of January 2010 to 31st 
December 2010 and another spread sheet from January 2008 to December 
2010. For each EGPWS removal event, the information obtained is as follows: 
Dataset 1 
 Part number 
 Serial number 
 Date of removal 
 Reason for removal 
 Aircraft registration number 
 Vendor 
Data set 2 
 Aircraft type 
 Ata chapter 
 Part number 
 Time since new 
 Time since fault  
 Time since overhaul 
 Removal date 
 Workshop note 
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5.8 EGPWS FAR regulation compliance 
Table 6-2 presents the FAR regulation compliance with regards to EGPWS. It 
describes the applicable regulation  and accepted probability of failure in 
possible failure condition of an EGPWS system. 
Table 5-2: FAR regulation compliance 
Failure condition Applicable regulations Probability of 
Failure P(F) 
Section 
Loss of all EGPWS 
Function 
AC-23-18, 7.d.(2) (a) 8.031x10-5 3.3  
False Annunciation of 
Mode 1 “Pull Up” Warning 
FAR, Part 23, 23.1309 (b) 
AC 23.1309-1C, 9.d. 
7.375x10-6 4.4 
Unannunciated loss of the 
Mode 1 “Pull Up” Warning 
FAR, Part 23, 23.1309 (b) 
AC 23.1309-1C, 9.d. 
9.368x10-6 5.5 
False Annunciation of 
Mode 2 “Pull Up” Warning 
FAR, Part 23, 23.1309 (b) 
AC 23.1309-1C, 9.d. 
5.909x10-6 6.5 
Unannunciated loss of the 
Mode 1 “Pull Up” Warning 
FAR, Part 23, 23.1309 (b) 
AC 23.1309-1C, 9.d. AC 
23-18, 7.d.(2)(b) 
6.783x10-6 7.7 
False Annunciation of 
Terrain Awareness “Pull 
Up” Warning 
FAR, Part 23, 23.1309 (b) 
AC 23.1309-1C, 9.d. AC 
23-18, 7.d.(2)(b) 
1.669x10-6 8.6 
Unannunciated loss of the 
Terrain Awareness “Pull 
Up” Warning 
FAR, Part 23, 23.1309 (b) 
AC 23.1309-1C, 9.d. AC 
23-18, 7.d.(2)(c) 
7.289x10-6 9.9 
Hazardously Misleading 
Information on the Terrain 
Awareness Display 
AC 23-18, 7.d.(2)(d) 1.203x10-5 10.9 
Failure of the installed 
TAWS should not degrade 
any integrity of any 
installed system with the 
TAWS interfaces that 
could have either 
hazardous or catastrophic 
failure conditions as 
defines by AC23.1309-1C 
AC 23-18, 7.d.(2)(e) Qualitative 
analysis 
1.5 
5.9 SLAAP for EGPWS 
Most current avionic systems utilize a federated architecture. Each line 
replaceable unit (LRU) is an independent device made by different 
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manufacturers using potentially very different design approaches. Technological 
diversity and fractal design present a host of challenges to the avionics 
maintenance and logistics process. Each LRU manufacturers provide 
independent diagnostic capability for its unit in the form of built -in -test (BIT), 
automated test equipment (ATE), and test program sets (TPS).  
Non-uniformity of test equipment and unrealized overlap of functional capability 
results in excess test resources at all levels of the maintenance system and 
inhibits interoperability through the inflexibility of process. Commonly lost in this 
process is the working requirement that these distinct avionic components 
function side by side, in a largely autonomous fashion, to provide the total 
system functionality required to fulfil the aircraft’s mission. 
It is this integration and its potential system-level effects that have not been 
considered by the current maintenance infrastructure. Exposing this integration 
of avionics components through the capture and meaningful retention of all 
available data can contribute significant intelligence to avionics diagnostics and 
repair (Kalgren et. al., 2004). 
SLAAP includes several models of computation such as the Markov Model, 
Kaplan Meier Chart, MTTF and Cox’s Regression Analysis. Different models of 
computation can be chosen with regards to availability of data to be analysed. 
SLAAP uses a standard graphical user interface with specific functions to be 
determined. The GUI is presented with a design window to insert inputs and 
calculate outputs or produce graphs.This behaviour is implemented in a 
specially formulated Matlab code. 
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  CHAPTER 6
 RESULTS 6
In this chapter, the application of methodology developed will be illustrated. 
Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) was chosen as a test model for 
the analysis for several reasons. The first reason it is chosen because it is one 
of the equipment of avionics used on board aircraft and secondly, because 
prognostics are feasible and cost-worthy to be applied to safety related 
equipment for cost effectiveness. The other reasons are that the data needed 
for analysis is readily available online and thus the MTBUR and MTBF can be 
compared theoretically and thus, possible to validate field data obtained. The 
last reason is that the equipment falls under ‘navigation’ section of avionics that 
proves to have high breakdown rate. 
6.1 Case studies for trend analysis 
The sample data sets for the case studies were gathered from several airlines 
including Malaysian Airlines and Royal Brunei Airlines. These data consists of 
different types of component removal considered as discrepancies that was 
classified under several ATA chapters. Aircraft fleet involved as sampling 
consists of ATR 72-500, B727, B737, B737-400 (B734), Boeing 767-33AER, 
A319, and A320. There are also sample data that was specifically on EGPWS 
LRUs only. The objective of this section is to analyse and understand common 
problems and trends in maintenance line and then use the methods described 
in the previous chapters to establish results. 
 Source 1 (ATR 72-500 component removal data) 6.1.1
This data was gathered from Maswings and Firefly aircraft, companies which 
are both under Malaysian Airlines Berhad, based in Malaysia. Components 
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removals were gathered between August 2008 and March 2010. The summary 
of the removals are presented in Table 6-1 and will be explained in the 
subsections that follow. 
Table 6-1: Summary of ATR aircraft components removal 
Airline Date Number of data 
Maswings 1 (MW1) 22/9/2008-31/12/2009 416 
Maswings 2 (MW2) 4/2/2010-1/3/2010 25 
Firefly 1 (FF1) 22/8/2008-22/1/2010 510 
Firefly 2 (FF2) 12/1/2010-8/3/2010 35 
6.1.1.1 Maswings 1 data collection 
For the Maswings 1 collection of data, the top three ATA chapters that produce 
highest component removal are from ATA 32 – Landing Gear (46%), ATA 24 – 
Electrical Power (11%) and ATA 34 – Navigation (6%) which occurs from 2008 
to 2009 as shown in Figure 6-1. The removal was 86% unscheduled which is 
shown in Figure 6-3.  
 
Figure 6-1: MW1 record of ATA chapter count 
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Figure 6-2: Common removal for Chapter 34 (Navigation) 
Figure 6-2 shows the detail of data from ATA Chapter 34 of ATR aircraft data 
for MW1 whereby the common removal is from Terrain and Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System (T2CAS) labelled as 9000000-10008 and radio altimeter 
labelled as 959960714562. Both of these components are categorised as one 
of the components in TAWS or the position and warning system of aircraft.  
 
Figure 6-3: Scheduled versus Unscheduled removal of components of MW1 
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Figure 6-4 elaborates the number of Maswings 1 aircraft by category. Out of the 
6 aircraft, 9M-MWA (MWA) has the highest removal with a count of components 
removal. 
 
Figure 6-4: Count of aircraft registration or tail number of MW1 
6.1.1.2 Maswings 2 data collection 
From this record labelled as MW2, a number of 25 data was collected from ATA 
Chapters 23, 24, 30, 32, 34. The highest count of removal has been from ATA 
32, which is the landing system. However, ATA 34, which is navigation, is 
among the highest three removals. Figure 6-5 shows the graph that illustrates 
the count for ATA chapters in MW2 record and Figure 6-6 shows the count of 
aircraft based on the registration number of category MW2. 
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Figure 6-5: MW2 record of ATA chapter count 
 
Figure 6-6: Count of aircraft registration or tail number of MW2 
6.1.1.3 Firefly 1 data collection 
This record gathered an amount of 510 samples of data. Based on Figure 6-7, 
the majority of removal is from ATA chapter 32 (landing gear). The Figure 6-8 
shows once again the unscheduled removal being the majority cases as 
compared to a scheduled removal of components in an airlines maintenance 
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line. Lastly, Figure 6-9 shows the count of aicraft registration or tail number for 
FF1 data. 
 
Figure 6-7: FF1 record of ATA chapter count 
 
Figure 6-8: Scheduled versus Unscheduled removal of components of FF1 
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Figure 6-9: Count of aircraft registration or tail number of FF1 
6.1.1.4 Firefly 2 data collection 
From this record labelled as FF2, a number of 35 data was collected from ATA 
Chapters 24, 26, 27, 32, 36, 61. The highest count of removal has been from 
ATA 32, which is the landing system as shown in Figure 6-10 and count of 
aircraft registration or tail number of FF2 is shown in Figure 6-11.  
 
Figure 6-10: FF2 record of ATA chapter count 
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Figure 6-11: Count of aircraft or tail number of FF2 
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 Source 2 (EGPWS removal data for Boeing 727, 737)  6.1.2
Table 6-2: EGPWS removal including EGPWC and Terrain Display Unit (TDU) for EGPWC and TDU 
P/N S/N Removal date Reason for removal Aircraft RegistrationVendor Repair shop findings Aircraft type
80-5145-9-3 111 30/05/2008 FO EGPWS INOP 9M-TGG HONEYWELLNil record from Tspares B727-247
80-5145-9-3 325 04/06/2008 CAPT EGPWS INSERVICEABLE 9M-TGG HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-247
80-5145-9-3 289 17/06/2008 CAPT TDU INOP 9M-TGH HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-247
80-5145-9-3 125 17/12/2008 FO TDU INOP HS-SCH  (TGJ)HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-247
80-5145-9-3 327 22/06/2009 CAPT TDU INOP 9M-TGM HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-200
80-5145-9-3 386 10/04/2010 CAPT TDU NIL DISPLAY 9M-TGG HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-247
80-5145-9-3 323 14/06/2010 FO TDU GOES BLANK AND HOT 9M-TGB HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-200
80-5145-9-3 111 02/10/2010 FO TDU INOP 9M-TGM HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-200
80-5145-9-3 288 15/11/2010 CAPT TDU GOES BLANK 9M-TGB HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-200
80-5145-9-3 323 29/12/2010 CAPT TDU UNABLE TO ADJ BRIGHTNESS 9M-TGB HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-200
80-5145-9-3 199 30/12/2008 CAPT TDU UNSERVICEABLE 9M-PMW HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B737
80-5145-9-3 9570 27/06/2010 CAPT TDU GOES BLANK 9M-PMW HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B737
965-1076-020-212-212 2707 28/03/2008 Both captain and FO terrain warning INOP HS-SCJ  (TKJ)HONEYWELLNil record from Tspares B727-247
965-1076-020-212-212 487 04/08/2008 No terrain displayed on TDUs 9M-TGE HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-200
965-1076-020-212-212 N/A 22/09/2008 FO TDU INOP 9M-TGM HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-200
965-1076-020-212-212 2707 17/11/2008 GPWS MODE "TERRAIN" INOP HS-SCJ  (TKJ)HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-247
965-1076-020-212-212 3791 29/05/2009 EGPWS INOP 9M-TGH HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-247
965-1076-020-214-214 2876 26/11/2009 WINDSHEAR AND GPWS FAIL LIGHTS ON AND "NO TERRAIN" & TERRAIN SYSTEM OVERRIDE LIGHTS REMAINS ON 9M-TGG HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-247
965-1076-020-212-212 4123 26/03/2010 TERRAIN SYSTEM OVERRIDE LIGHTS REMAIN ON 9M-TGG HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-247
965-1076-020-212-212 3747 04/06/2010 TERRAIN WARNING SYSTEM INOP 9M-TGE HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B727-200
965-1076-020-212-214 3270 11/07/2010 TERRAIN WARNING DISPLAY INOP 9M-TGE HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B727-200
965-1076-020-212-214 3270 13/05/2010 EGPWS NUISSANCE "PULL UP" WARNING CAME ON WHEN ESTABLISHED ON GLIDEPATH 9M-PML HONEYWELLDefect not confirmed B737
965-1076-020-212-214 2876 18/07/2010 EGPWS "NO TERRAIN" DISPLAYED ALL  THE TIME 9M-PML HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B737
965-1076-020-212-212 3747 11/07/2010 EGPWS "NO TERRAIN" DISPLAYED ALL  THE TIME 9M-PML HONEYWELLDefect confirmed B737
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Table 6-2 describes the data for EGPWS removal from 30th May 2008 to 29th of 
December 2010. These data were gathered from Transmile Airlines now known 
as Raya Airways.  
 
Figure 6-12: Count of aircraft registration for EGPWC removal 
 
Figure 6-13: Count of aircraft registration for TDU removal 
The data in Table 6-2 consists of EGPWC and TDU removal of aircrafts of B727 
and B737. Figure 6-12 and Figure 6-13 show the summary of aircraft count 
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based on aircraft registration for the removal of EGPWC and TDU. The total 
unscheduled removal over period of 3 years for EGPWC is 12 and the total 
unscheduled removal over period of 3 years for TDU is also 12. Based on fleet, 
for EGPWC, B727 contributes a total of 9 removals while B737 contributes a 
total of 3 removals. For TDU removals, a number 10 removal has been made 
on B727 and 2 removals have been done on B737. The Table 6-3 illustrates the 
number of flight hours for the two aircraft in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Table 6-4 
shows the total flight hours characterised by type of aircraft for the three 
consecutive years. 
Table 6-3: Yearly flight hours recorded for B727 and B737 
  2008 2009 2010 
Flight hours B727 B737 B727 B737 B727 B737 
8790 2583 8350 675 7729 1667 
Total Flight 
hours 
11373 
 
9025 9396 
 
Table 6-4: Total flight hours for the three years for B727 & B737 
B727 Total Flight Hours 
(2008 through 2010) 
8790+8350+7729 24869 
B737 Total Flight Hours 
(2008 through 2010) 
2583+675+1667 4925 
With the removal records from the sample data, the MTBUR and MTBF can be 
calculated. From the MTBF, failure rate can then be known. With failure rate 
value known, it can then be compared with the benchmark given by the original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM). The OEM for this product is Honeywell 
International Incorporated. 
In order to determine the MTBUR Equation 6-1 and Equation 6-2 has been 
used: 
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periodthatforremovaldunscheduleofnumber
aircraftperinstalledunitshoursflightMTBUR
______
____ 
  
(Equation 6-1) 
And, in order to calculate the MTBF, this equation has been used: 
periodthatduringfailureconfirmedofnumber
aircraftperinstalledunitshoursflightMTBF
______
____ 
  
(Equation 6-2) 
  
From Honeywell Product specification which is available online as characterised 
according to function and according to component in the fault tree diagram; the 
loss of all EGPWS functions given the probability per flight hour is presented to 
be 8.031x10-5 and so, the calculated MTBF is 12451.7 hours. The given the 
failure rate of EGPWC per flight hour is 80x10-6, so, the MTBF is then 12500 
hours. 
6.1.2.1 EGPWC removal 
The calculation for MTBUR and MTBF is shown below using equations 7-1 and 
7-2. 
MTBUR for EGPWC: 
B727 MTBUR (EGPWC) = 24869 × ଵ
ଽ
= 2763.3	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
B737 MTBUR (EGPWC) = 4925 × ଵ
ଷ
= 1642	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
Thus, the average MTBUR (EGPWC) is 2202.5 hours 
 
MTBF for EGPWC: 
B727 MTBF (EGPWC) = 24869 × ଵ
ସ
= 6217.25	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
B737 MTBF (EGPWC) = 4925 × ଵ
ଶ
= 2462.5	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
Average MTBF (EGPWC) = 4339.9 hours  
Thus, failure rate for EGPWC is then 230.42 x 10-6 per hour 
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6.1.2.2 TDU removal  
The calculation for MTBUR and MTBF is shown below using equations 7-1 and 
7-2. 
MTBUR for TDU: 
B727 MTBUR (TDU) = 24869 × ଶ
ଵ଴
= 4974	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
B737 MTBUR (TDU) = 4925 × ଶ
ଶ
= 4925	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
Average MTBUR (TDU) = 4949.5 hours 
 
MTBF for TDU: 
B727 MTBF (TDU) = 24869 × ଶ
ସ
= 12434.5	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
B737 MTBF (TDU) = 4925 × ଶ
ଶ
= 9850	ℎ݋ݑݎݏ 
Average MTBF (TDU) = 111142 hours 
 
Thus, the average MTBF (EGPWC and TDU) is 57741 hours,  
It can be concluded that the failure rate for the items is as above expected 
performance standard whereby the MTBF benchmark for EGPWS was found to 
be 12451.7 hours.  
 Source 3 (EGPWS removal data 737-400) 6.1.3
In this set of TAWS/EGPWS removal data of Boeing 737-400 aircraft, a number 
of 35 samples have been collected. Figure 6-14 shows the monthly removal 
trend for the particular aircraft. However, only 16 (46%) was a confirmed failure 
and 19 (54%) has been labelled as defect not confirmed. From the records, the 
MTBUR was calculated using Equation (6-1) and are found to be 2617.257 
hours and the calculated MTBF using Equation (6-2) to be 7046.462 hours. The 
total flight hours recorded for the sample given is 91604 hours. So, from the 
MTBF number then, failure rate is found to be 141.915x10-6 hours. 
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Figure 6-14: Removal of EGPWS monthly for B737-400 (B734) 
With this set of data, Kaplan Meier chart can be used to calculate the time to 
failure which was found to be 40000 plus hours (42717) as shown in Figure 6-
15. 
 
Figure 6-15: Kaplan Meier Chart for B737-400 (B734) using the TSN value 
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An example of a Matlab software based GUI for the Kaplan Meier simulation 
produced an output as shown in Figure 6-16 which was run using input given in 
the Appendix. Inputs include State Transition (ST), Number at risk, and Number 
of failure. 
 
Figure 6-16: Kaplan Meier GUI 
 Source 4 (ATA 34 removal data Airbus) 6.1.4
This data contains removal report for Airbus A319 and Airbus A320 aircrafts for 
the year 2003 through 2010 from Royal Brunei Airlines. The data sample was 
specifically chosen for ATA chapter 34 which focused on Navigation 
Instruments.  It has been labelled using A, B, C, and D and consists of the 
following number of samples: 
1. Airbus A- 327 samples 
2. Airbus B- 291 samples 
3. Airbus C- 93 samples (up to 2006 only) 
4. Airbus D- 334 samples 
6.1.4.1 Airbus A 
These data sets contain removal report from 26th August 2003 to 9th of January 
2011. Out of these data sets, 13 reported on GPWS. One example of recorded 
report states ‘NAV GPWS FAULT DURING CLB, MSG DISAPPEARED ON 
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LANDING’. From Table , MA refers to Maintenance Report and PI refers to 
defects reported by pilots and it can be concluded that faults were detected 
during flight or during pre-flight as faults were detected and reported by pilots.  
Table 6-5: Summary of removal report for ATA 34 
Airbus Dates Sample Count MA PI 
A 26/8/2011-9/1/2011 327 46% 54% 
B 8/9/2003- 4/1/2011 291 53% 47% 
C 16/1/2004-9/3/2006 93 39% 61% 
D 25/9/2010-9/1/2011 334 32% 68% 
 
 Source 5 (ATA 34 removal data Boeing) 6.1.5
The data gathered for this section was from Royal Brunei Airlines. The aircraft 
under analysis were six Boeing 767-33AER aircraft.  These data includes 
discrepancies dated from 2nd January 2009 to 15th December 2010. The data 
consisted of 523 recorded discrepancies which falls under ATA 34. All 
categories under the ATA 34 such as the 3410, 3420 and 3460 were highlighted 
as shown in Figure 6-17. 
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Figure 6-17: A two-year discrepancies of ATA 34 of B767 aircraft 
6.2 Case study for Proportional Hazard Ratio  
A series of analysis was done to calculate the beta values of covariates 
(temperature and stress) using the failure rates generated for a digital circuit 
board. The purpose of this analysis is to study the effect of temperature and 
stress on failure rates of the device. In this case, the failure rate is fitted for Cox 
Proportional hazard function with the variable, X being temperature and stress 
using some sample data in Table 7-6. There are two environment classifications 
to the data which are the ground benign and ground fixed. The table lists the 
failure rates at different combination of temperature and stress conditions of a 
digital circuit board. An assessment of the significance of the predictor variable 
will follow afterwards.  
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Table 6-6: Digital circuit board failure rates in 106 part-hours (Denson, 1998) 
 Ground benign Ground fixed 
Temperature 10°C 70°C 10°C 70°C 
Stress 10% 50% 10% 50% 10% 50% 10% 50% 
ALCATEL 6.59 10.18 13.30 19.89 22.08 29.79 32.51 47.27 
Bellcore Issue 4 5.72 7.09 31.64 35.43 8.56 10.63 47.46 53.14 
Bellcore Issue 5 8.47 9.25 134.45 137.85 16.94 18.49 268.90 275.70 
British Telecom 
HDR4 
6.72 6.72 6.72 6.72 9.84 9.84 9.84 9.84 
British Telecom 
HDR5 
2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 
MH-217E Notice 1 10.92 20.20 94.37 111.36 36.38 56.04 128.98 165.91 
MH-217F Notice 1 9.32 18.38 20.15 35.40 28.31 48.78 45.44 79.46 
MH-217F Notice 2 6.41 9.83 18.31 26.76 24.74 40.15 73.63 119.21 
To compare empirical methodologies, the failure rates in Table 6-6 were each 
calculated for each combination of environment. The analysis using Cox’s 
hazard function is represented in Table 6-7. Using the beta values found, 
prediction of hazard ratio between different environments can be analysed. 
Table 6-7: Results of “covariate b” or the coefficient, b using Cox’s Regression 
analysis for temperature and stress on failure rates 
Ground benign Ground fixed 
Temperature 
constant 
Stress constant Temperature 
constant 
Stress constant 
10° 70° 10% 50% 10° 70° 10% 50% 
10% 
0 
70% 
1 
10% 
0 
50% 
1 
10° 
0 
70° 
1 
10° 
0 
70° 
1 
10% 
0 
70% 
1 
10% 
0 
50% 
1 
10° 
0 
70° 
1 
10° 
0 
70° 
1 
0.3034 0.2721 0.6648 0.5054 -0.8043 -0.3615 -1.6139 -1.2648 
These results from Table 6-7 are interpreted using the GUI as shown in Figure 
6.18 and Figure 6.19. 
For example, if Ground Fixed was considered at 10% constant stress, covariate 
b was calculated to be -1.6139. Hazard ratio in this case has also been 
calculated. The estimated hazard ration calculated using exp(b) is 0.1991. This 
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carries a meaning that hazard for 70° is 0.1991 higher than that of 10° 
temperature. The explanation is based on the following: 
To predict survival as a function of a dichotomous IV such as an 
Experimental v control groups;   
In such cases, the IV is treated as a dummy variable and coded either 0 
or 1 
The resulting Cox regression model:  
h (t) = [h0 (t) ] e ( b1X1) 
When X = 0, h (t) = [h0 (t) ] (1), since e0 = 1 
When X = 1, h (t) = [ h0 (t) ] e ( b1) (1) 
b1 = Cox regression coefficient, determined by partial likelihood 
estimation using matlab function  
Linearizing the Hazard Function with a Dichotomous Independent 
Variable 
h (t) = [h0 (t) ] e ( b1X1) 
Dividing both sides by h0 (t) 
h (t)     = [ h0 (t) ] e ( b1X1)  
h0 (t)      [ h0 (t) ]  
h (t)     =   e ( b1X1) 
  h0 (t) 
This is the hazard ratio or relative hazard  which is Exp (b).  
This ratio indicates the expected change in the risk of the terminal event 
when X changes from 0 to 1. (i.e. 1 = presence of the characteristic X) 
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When X = 0, the hazard ratio = 1.0 
When X = 1, the hazard ratio Exp(b) = e ( b1) 
Possible Relationships 
If the hazard ratio = 1; The IV does not affect survival.  
If the hazard ratio  1; The IV is associated with increased survival 
If the hazard ratio is  1; The IV is associated with decreased survival 
If the hazard ratio = 1; The parameter does not affect the time to failure.  
If the hazard ratio  1; The parameter is associated with decreased time 
to failure 
If the hazard ratio is  1; The parameter is associated with increased 
time to failure. 
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Figure 6-18: GUI for calculating the Hazard Ratio of Constant Pressure 
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Figure 6-19: GUI for calculating the Hazard Ratio for Constant Temperature 
6.3 Case study using Markov Model 
The case study for Markov Model illustrates the use of fault tree to find the 
failure rates at different stages of a system. From the fault tree diagram below, 
mean time to failure (MTTF) can be calculated using Markov model. The 
diagram below has been simplified to show less complicated method in 
achieving time to failure value. This method uses eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
in finding estimated failure time. As such, any system with known fault tree 
diagram and failure rate of components can apply such method easily. As 
opposed to just fault tree diagram, Markov model gives a quantitative insight to 
a problem and will be an added advantage for top level, black box analysis for 
any system. In a way, Markov model uses linear regression analysis in solving 
P(t). 
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Figure 6-20: EGPWC fault tree from product specification list 
From the fault tree in Figure 6-20, the minimum cut set of the above fault tree 
can be simplified. It only highlights the major events which affect loss of all 
EGPWS functions as shown in Figure 6-21. The simplified fault tree has been 
labelled appropriately with representation of A, B and C as the bottom level 
event as shown in Figure 6-22. From there, the conversion of fault tree to 
Markov Model has been made. With the failure rate value fitted in in the Markov 
Model, the links or state transition diagram is drawn for further analysis.  This is 
shown in Figure 6-23, where the failure rates are fitted into the transition 
diagram which shows the event change for all possible states. 
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Figure 6-21: Simplified fault tree 
 
Figure 6-22: Basic fault tree from simplified diagram 
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Figure 6-23: Markov state diagram for top level EGPWS fault tree 
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Failure rate value derived from the fault tree from product specification has 
allocated as in Table 6-8: 
Table 6-8: Failure rate from fault tree 
λA 0.0001895 
λB 0.0009687 
λC 0.000068966 
1-λA 0.9998105 
1-λB 0.9990313 
1-λC 0.999931 
Step 1: Set up transition matrix (Q) from failure rate data 
Step 2: Find P(t) by finding eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Q 
Step 3: Establish equation for P(t) 
Step 4: Determine limiting distribution for each state 
Step 5: Set up minimum cut set transition matrix to find Pnew(t)  
Step 6: Determine ܴ(ݐ) = ∑ ௡ܲ௘௪(ݐ)  
Step 7: Find MTTF using  ܯܶܶܨ = ∫ ܴ(ݐ)݀ݐஶ଴  
The entire algorithm above has been realised using MATLAB and can be seen 
in Figure  
 
Q=[-0.0012272 0.0001895 0.0009687 0 0.00006896 0 0;0.9998105 -1.0008 0 
0.0009687 0 .000068966 0; 0.9990313 0 -0.9992899 189.5E-6 0 0 
0.000068966; 0 0.9990313 0.9998105 -1.9988 0 0 0; 0.999931 0 0 0 -
1.0011 189.5E-6 0.9687E-3; 0 0.999931 0 0 0.9998105 -1.9997 0; 0 0 
0.999931 0 0.9990313 0 -1.999] 
[V D]=eig(Q) 
syms t; 
P0=[1 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
P=P0*V*expm(D*t)*inv(V); 
Pt=vpa(P) 
 
Q = 
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   -0.0012    0.0002    0.0010         0    0.0001         0         0 
    0.9998   -1.0008         0    0.0010         0    0.0001         0 
    0.9990         0   -0.9993    0.0002         0         0    0.0001 
         0    0.9990    0.9998   -1.9988         0         0         0 
    0.9999         0         0         0   -1.0011    0.0002    0.0010 
         0    0.9999         0         0    0.9998   -1.9997         0 
         0         0    0.9999         0    0.9990         0   -1.9990 
 
 
V = 
 
   -0.3780    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0001    0.0006   -0.0000 
   -0.3780   -0.0002   -0.0000   -0.0007   -0.5780   -0.0003    0.0006 
   -0.3780   -0.0001   -0.0000   -0.0001    0.0003   -0.5808    0.0004 
   -0.3780    0.1528    0.1014    0.7069   -0.5778   -0.5817    0.0010 
   -0.3780   -0.0006   -0.0001    0.0007    0.0019    0.0120    0.5770 
   -0.3780    0.9058   -0.9437   -0.1211   -0.5762    0.0117    0.5776 
   -0.3780    0.3952    0.3148   -0.6969    0.0022   -0.5693    0.5775 
 
 
D = 
 
   -0.0000         0         0         0         0         0         0 
         0   -2.0005         0         0         0         0         0 
         0         0   -1.9995         0         0         0         0 
         0         0         0   -1.9999         0         0         0 
         0         0         0         0   -1.0000         0         0 
         0         0         0         0         0   -1.0000         0 
         0         0         0         0         0         0   -1.0000 
 
  
Pt = 
  
0.99877*exp(0*t)+0.17258e-6*exp(-2 *t)+0.371e-7*exp(-1.999*t)+0.536e-7*exp(-
1.999*t)+0.1883e-3*exp(-1*t)+0.9668e-3*exp(-1*t)+0.7148e-4*exp(-1*t),  
 
0.1893e-3*exp(0*t)-0.1038e-6*exp(-2*t)-0.854e-8*exp(-1.999*t)-0.842e-7*exp(-
1.999*t)-0.189e-3*exp(-1*t)-0.991e-7*exp(-1*t)-0.204e-6*exp(-1*t), 
 
0.9685e-3*exp(0*t)-0.142e-6*exp(-2*t)-0.539e-7*exp(-1.999*t)-0.5464e-7*exp(-
1.999*t)+0.467e-6*exp(-1*t)-0.967e-3*exp(-1*t)-0.131e-5*exp(-1*t), 
 
0.1836e-6*exp(0*t)+0.731e-7*exp(-2*t)+0.2529e-7*exp(-1.999*t)+0.852-7*exp(-
1.999*t)-0.1831e-6*exp(-1*t)-0.18363e-6*exp(-1*t)-0.4458e-9*exp(-1*t), 
 
0.6888e-4*exp(0*t)-0.996e-7*exp(-2*t)-0.118e-7*exp(-1.999*t)+0.316e-7*exp(-
1.999*t)+0.2069e-6*exp(-1*t)+0.878e-6*exp(-1*t)-0.6988e-4*exp(-1*t), 
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0.1306e-7*exp(0*t)+0.3081e-7*exp(-2*t)-0.1674e-7*exp(-1.999*t)-0.10382*exp(-
1.999*t)-0.12986e-7*exp(-1*t)+0.1596e-9*exp(-1*t)-0.13261e-7*exp(-1*t), 
 
0.6679e-7*exp(0*t)+0.688e-7*exp(-2*t)+0.2857e-7*exp(-1.999*t)-0.3056e-7*exp(-
1.999*t)+0.2328e-9*exp(-1*t)-0.6593e-7*exp(-1*t)-0.67856e-7*exp(-1*t) 
 
 
 
syms t; 
Q=[-0.0012272 0.0001895 0.0009687;0.9998105 -1.0008 0; 0.9990313 0 -
0.9992899]; 
[V D]=eig(Q); 
P0=[1 0 0]; 
P=P0*V*expm(D*t)*inv(V); 
Pt=vpa(P) 
 
Pt = 
  
0.9988*exp(-.694e-4*t)+0.506e-3*exp(-1*t)+0.651e-3*exp(-1*t), 
 
0.189e-3*exp(-.694e-4*t)+0.1298e-3*exp(-1*t)-0.319e-3*exp(-1*t), 
 
0.968e-3*exp(-.6936e-4*t)-0.636e-3*exp(-1*t)-0.332e-3*exp(-1*t) 
  
 >>  
 
P1=(0.99884288089923034958045305504472/0.0000693577016739370730410638166
14127)+(0.00050612129455726605682202990553425/1.000060912711275173947456
0963572)+(0.00065099780621238538936622010328356/1.0011868295870502976185
889565386) 
 
P1 = 
 
  1.4401e+004 
The results: 
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Figure 6-24: GUI for MTTF Calculation 
MTTF evaluated by Markov model yields 14401 as compared to theoretical 
value of 14234.9. This value has been obtained from failure rate of 7.025x10-5 
per flight hour. This is shown in Figure 6.24. The input is entered on the left 
hand side of the GUI simulation and can be seen in Figure 6-25. The Figure 6-
26 to Figure 6-32 shows the out graph for simulation at different states of the 
Markov Chain. 
 
Figure 6-25: Input entered in GUI for Markov Model Simulation 
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Figure 6-26: Markov Model Simulation at State 1 
 
Figure 6-27: Markov Model Simulation at State 2 
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Figure 6-28: Markov Model Simulation at State 3 
 
 
Figure 6-29: Markov Model Simulation at State 4 
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Figure 6-30: Markov Model Simulation at State 5 
 
Figure 6-31: Markov Model Simulation at State 6 
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Figure 6-32: Markov Model Simulation at State 7 
6.4 Case study using various reliability standards 
Table 6-9 describes the different quality for various reliability standards that can 
be applied to avionics. The highest reliability amongst all four is the MIL-HDBK 
217, which most avionics specification refers to. The highest specification in 
terms of quality has to be for space usage, where faults and failure cannot be 
tolerated. 
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Table 6-9: Heritage-based MTBF for small, medium and large characteristic units 
(Borer et al., 2010) 
Quality Unit size MIL-HDBK 
217 
Relex RiaC Vendor 
DB 
Space Small 183429 183429 183429 183429 
Medium 100000 100000 100000 100000 
Large 52543 52543 52543 52543 
Military Small 18343 50519 146743 141057 
Medium 10000 27542 80000 76900 
Large 5254 14471 42034 40406 
Rugged Small 9171 32741 91715 84561 
Medium 5000 17849 50000 46100 
Large 2627 9379 26272 24222 
Communication Small 4586 14962 36686 42372 
Medium 2500 8157 20000 23100 
Large 1314 4286 10509 12137 
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Figure 6-33: Bar graph generated based on the Table 6-9 
As shown in Figure 6-33, Space category shows the highest MTBF as 
compared to the military and rugged category. This reliability number reflects 
the least expected of failure time of those components or systems. 
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Table 6-10: Failure rate according to size of EGPWS  
  Items Failure rate (10-6) 
1 Cockpit speakers 2.1 
2 Cockpit lamps 4.455 
3 Discreet switches 6.37 
4 Internal GPS circuit card assembly 10.909 
5 TA/Wx Relay 28 
6 Global positioning system 85.7 
7 Radio altimeter 198.5 
8 Data computer 205 
9 TA display 227.1 
10 Instrument landing system 312 
Table 6-10 contains data of EGPWS failure rate which will be cross synthesised 
with the reliability standards given in Table 6-9. For example, as shown in Table 
6-11, a radio altimeter has a failure rate of 198.5(10-6), and according to the 
reliability standards in Table 6-9, MTBF of 5050.5 falls under the ‘large’ 
category. 
Table 6-11: Failure rate conversion to MTBF and size 
 Failure rate 
(10-6) 
MTBF Component 
Size 
Radio altimeter 198.5 5050.5 large 
Data computer 205 4878 large 
Instrument landing system 312 3205.1 large 
Global positioning system 85.7 11668.6 medium 
Internal GPS circuit card assembly 10.909 91667.4 medium 
Cockpit lamps 4.455 224466.9 small 
Cockpit speakers 2.1 476190.5 small 
Discreet switches  6.37 156985.9 small 
TA/Wx Relay 28 35714.3 medium 
TA display 227.1 4403.3 large 
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 Failure rate temperature dependent of avionics 6.4.1
Because all electronics are susceptible to temperature changes, failure rate of 
avionics will take effect as well. In a study by Vaziry-Zanjany, failure rate 
increases as junction temperature increases for typical integrated circuit (IC) 
components. 
 
Figure 6-34: Temperature in Celsius versus relative failure rate 
The Figure 6-34 describes the average failure rate demonstrated from a typical 
two extreme groups of avionics components that are highly (graph A) shown in 
Figure 6-35 and poorly (graph B) as shown in Figure 6-36. According to the 
study, at 100 degrees Celsius, the rate of failure is 0.4x106 per hour, for 
component A.  
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Figure 6-35: Based on Graph A (Vaziry-Zanjany, 1996) 
 
Figure 6-36: Based on graph B (Vaziry-Zanjany, 1996) 
Figure 6-37 on the other hand has been averaged based on the two graphs A 
and B. The failure rate determined to relate failure rate and temperature junction 
for avionics equipment follows the following formula: 
λ= 
32 )7exp(5713.600007575.000322.006058.0 junctionjunctionjunction TTT   
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Figure 6-37: Based on Table C-7 (Vaziry-Zanjany, 1996) 
In Figure 6-38, the three graphs are shown on the same window.  
 
Figure 6-38: The three curves shown on one platform for comparison 
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The failure rate however, shows very insignificant values where the failure rates 
were significantly small. With the reliability standards set earlier, failure rates 
were scaled up by a factor of 10 and simulated again for results. It can be seen 
in Figure 6-39 that the values were more realistic and can be used to correlate 
future failure rate-temperature data. 
 
Figure 6-39: The graphs scaled up by a factor of 10 
The graphs of scaled up failure rate and temperature were drawn up with the 
four reliability benchmark of MIL-HDBL, RELEX, RiAC and vendor as shown in 
Figure 6-40 to Figure 6-43. And the correlation of each graphs were also 
calculated.  From observation RiAC was possibly the closest of the three 
reliabilty standards where the curve fitted best.   
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Figure 6-40: The reliability standard of MIL-HDBK with temperature dependent 
graphs 
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Figure 6-41: The reliability standard of RELEX with temperature dependent 
graphs 
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Figure 6-42: The reliability standard of RiAC with temperature dependent graphs 
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Figure 6-43: The reliability standard of Vendor with temperature dependent 
graphs 
 Correlation analysis 6.4.2
From the Table 7-12, it can be concluded that the trend or pattern for correlation 
analysis shows that MIL-HDBK correlates the highest with the EGPWS failure 
rate data. Similarly, the same result shows in Figure 7-47 where the EGPWS 
data has the closest pattern to MIL-HDBK as opposed to the other reliability 
standards shown. 
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Table 6-12: Correlation analysis using Microsoft Excel for all reliability methods 
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Figure 6-44: MTBF reliability standards with EGPWS components 
 
6.5 SDRS 
One method of assessing the removal pattern of an aircraft is by analysing a 
Service Difficulty Report (SDR). The SDR provides the necessary information. 
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An SDR is completed for instances of equipment inoperability. SDRs provide 
information about problems or failures of aircraft components and equipment 
("Automated Trend Monitoring for Service Difficulty Reports", 1998). SDRs are 
completed for each instance of equipment inoperability such as, in-service 
difficulties, malfunctions, and defects. The data collected and the result from the 
analysis will be shown in the tables and graphs. 
A number of Service Difficulty Report submitted to FAA (Federal Aviation 
Administration) under Navigation System (ATA 34) installed in Boeing Aircraft. 
The number of Service Difficulty Report that has been collected is present in the 
table below categorized according to few set of variables. This research 
analysed the trend of avionics equipment that is prone to system fault, which 
includes system malfunction, damaged, unserviceable by using data report from 
SDR database. Service Difficulty Reports (SDR) consist of maintenance 
incidents collected by the FAA for the purpose of tracking repair problems with 
private, commercial and military aircraft and aircraft component. This SDR 
reports data for the analysis which dated back from 1990 to present. They are 
largely self-reported by the aircraft owners. The data is reported by tail number 
and aircraft serial number, so it is possible to trace the maintenance history of 
the particular airplane with this database. 
Table 7.14 shows the number of reports regarding to the number of 
Service Difficulty Report submitted to FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) 
under Navigation (ATA 34) installed in Boeing Aircraft. According to the 
research that has been made, the researcher managed to collect faulty and 
problems data occurred in the equipment.  The reports contain several 
information includes submitter operation, type of aircraft, problem description, 
part or structure causing difficulty and etc. Each of the reports submitted to FAA 
is categorized according to its ATA chapter for ease review. 
Table 6-13: List of Service Difficulty Report for Navigation System (ATA 34) 
 
ATA 
 
Component 
No. of reports   
Percentage  
(%) 737 series 
only 
All Boeing 
Series 
3412  Air Data Computer System 96 285 33.68 
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3417 Altitude Alerting System 1 3 33.33 
3428 Inertial Reference System 41 103 39.81 
3431 VOR/ILS Navigation System 3 10 30 
3441 Weather Radar 300 781 38.41 
3442 GPWS 9 60 15 
3445 TCAS 6 45 13.33 
3448 Radio Altimeter 19 148 12.84 
3453 ATC 7 43 16.28 
3455 DME 5 40 12.5 
3457 ADF 0 14 0 
3458 GPS 7 14 50 
Total 494 1546 31.95 
6.6 Summary  
MTBF and MTBUR are considered key reliability metric or parameter that 
industries in aerospace and defence use. Even EGPWS manufacturers still 
refer to MIL HDBK-217F in their manual for EGPWS. MTBF predicts elapse 
time between what is defined as a failure of system during operation while 
MTBUR finds the average time (flying hours) that a component functions 
without the need of any unplanned removal for repair or maintenance. Although 
it is thought to be appropriate measurement in product reliability it is sometimes 
even a removal is considered non-trivial as removals can be quite rare.  
Table 6-14: Comparison of MTBUR and MTBF values 
 MTBUR MTBF 
Product Specification  7000 hours or better 10000 hours or better 
Calculation (Probability 
of loss of all EGPWS 
functions) top level 
analysis 
N/A 12451.7 hours. 
(Calculated from known 
Pfhr=8.031x10-5 per flight 
hour. 
:. λ=8.031x10-5 hour 
Source 2 (EGPWC) 2202.5 hours 4339.9 hours 
Source 2 (TDU) 4949.5 hours 111142 hours 
Source 3 2617.3 hours 7046.5 hours 
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  CHAPTER 7
 DISCUSSION 7
This chapter reports the findings by revisiting the presented research aim and 
objectives. This methodology aims to find the time to failure in order to provide 
ample time for maintenance personnel to take action before any avionic 
equipment fail. System level in this context means prognostics will be analysed 
at the line replaceable unit (LRU) which is a step higher than component level. 
This research work involves the integration of three research subjects which are 
prognostics methodology, degradation model and time to failure prediction. In 
order to achieve the aim of this research, research objectives were identified.  
7.1 Achievement of research aim and objectives 
The research aims are achieved by: 
 Objective 1 7.1.1
“To analyse the dependency of avionic systems including Line Replaceable 
Units (LRU) and Line Replaceable Modules (LRM) for fault propagation 
behaviour degradation” 
First of all, it can be concluded that the majority of avionics discrepancies are 
unscheduled. As a result, flight status will be affected. Secondly, the number of 
‘Navigation’ category of removal record was among the highest. The field data 
on EGPWS recorded an MTBF value which was roughly 3000 hours lower than 
the published product specification.  
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 Objective 2 7.1.2
“To research and develop methods to predict  the remaining useful life of 
avionics LRUs or LRMs” 
In the case of simulation of the fault tree diagram transformed into Markov 
model in achieving the probability of failure in each state of the fault tree, the 
dependencies among the components in the EGPWS system was established. 
The failure at each level could be seen to be affecting the probability of failure in 
relation to other components in the system. With regards to the results, it has 
been proven that the time to failure estimated by using this method is relatively 
precise whereby the MTTF evaluated by Markov model yields 14401 hours as 
compared to theoretical value of 14234.9 hours. This value of 14234.9 hours 
has been obtained from failure rate of 7.025x10-5 per flight hour. 
 Objective 3 7.1.3
“To research and develop methods to evaluate and predict the degradation 
performances of avionic systems” 
With regards to the reliability standards in avionics, few has been found to be 
showing strong correlation to the EGPWS MTBF scale of reading. After 
correlating the EGPWS data sample obtained from the product specification, 
MIL-HDBK reliability standards shows closest and highest correlation by a 
factor of 0.922. However, using the failure rate versus temperature standards 
which has been up scaled by a factor of 10, the EGPWS MTBF showed better 
correlation with the RIAC and the VENDOR reliability standards.  
One of the reasons being, product specification are to be produced with the 
most rigid quality standards and thus, the EGPWS MTBF value which was 
extracted from a product specification could have been following the stringent 
guidelines. The failure rate versus temperature model on the other hand, could 
have been more realistic although it has been up scaled by a factor of 10, it 
probably has improved as time passed.  
 151 
 Objective 4 7.1.4
“To develop software simulation systems to evaluate methods developed above 
considering aircraft environment and flight conditions in which avionics 
experience”.  
A matlab graphical user interface software has been created for the methods 
developed for the prognostics of avionics. This system is named “System Level 
Airborne Avionic Prognostics”. The two conditions considered were temperature 
and stress of an EGPWS (airborne avionics) system. 
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  CHAPTER 8
 CONCLUSION 8
This chapter aims to conclude this research by summarising the main 
contribution, limitations and present the future research in order to fulfil the aim 
and objectives of this work. It is also in this chapter that the thesis is finalised. 
8.1 Main contribution 
This research has contributed in investigating on prognostics methodology 
specifically for airborne avionics system, considering environmental features of 
temperature and stress as the factors. This study has suggested using different 
methodologies in finding estimated failure time of avionics equipment in helping 
MRO overcome logistic issues. 
In detail, these are the highlights of this study: 
 Critical analysis on different existing approaches suitable for prognostics 
study. This was done by studying trend of failures through component 
removal reported by airlines. Most of the reports had shown that majority 
removals were unscheduled and therefore contributed to major issues 
such as delays and aircraft on grounds. 
 Considered temperature and stress as an environmental factor that 
affects equipment failure. In this issue, the suggested methodology is by 
using the Cox’s regression analysis though the use of GUI software in 
seeing the highest possible contributor towards the failure of a system. 
One other method to predict failure time when field data are available; is 
the Markov Model.  
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 Included variety of reliability standards used in common avionics 
industry. For the study, in relating failure rates and temperature of avionic 
system, reliability standards such as the ML-HDBK, RELEX, RiAC and 
vendor were used as a benchmark.  
 Limitation to study 8.1.1
One main limitation of this study is that failure data is commercially sensitive 
and that limits the availability of data for analysis in this study. Because data is 
scarce, this study was fitted towards the kinds of data that was available. 
Another limitation of this study is that avionic equipment deteriorates at many 
different parts, at different times and into many levels of degradation. So, the 
definition of the exactly where the prognostics are applied can send different 
meaning to readers, It is also worth mentioning that this study focuses on 
system level which has been defined to be the LRU level of avionics. As such, it 
is hardly possible to actually pin point the exact failure time and as the nearest 
to it is probably looking into the probability of failure at an instantaneous period 
of time and probability of failure at different states of time. Other possibilities is 
to venture in examining the failure modes of equipment to look for common 
highest incidences and try to apply the methodologies developed on modules. 
8.2 Future research 
Further research is needed in order to improve on accuracy and precision of 
estimating failure time. This study should also further be developed for use in 
system design process, as a built-in rather than an add-on prognostic for 
avionics. Although real-life case study was used in this research for validation, 
more information is needed on various avionics LRU so proper justification can 
be provided to the airlines and OEM. Proposed changes would be feasible if 
data were more readily available. 
8.3 Research conclusion 
This study has presented on the approach of prognostics best suited for the 
airborne avionics systems. Although only top level solution n airborne avionics 
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system has been the focus of this research, it could provide a general view to 
the maintenance personnel to at least have an idea, when to expect a failure.  
The objectives of this research are met and a methodology to predict failure 
time using field data and product specification were proposed. The research 
has been unable to provide an intensive result of environmental factors which 
could have been impressive due to the limitation of sample data and would 
have required more work and time. 
Overall, it can be concluded that this research has enhanced the possibility of 
improving the avionics maintenance strategy process which plays a major role 
in the airline industry in general, but specifically focusing on MRO industry.
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APPENDIX 1 
GUI For Kaplan Meier  Chart Source Code 
 
function varargout = kaplan_meier(varargin) 
% KAPLAN_MEIER MATLAB code for kaplan_meier.fig 
%      KAPLAN_MEIER, by itself, creates a new KAPLAN_MEIER or raises 
the existing 
%      singleton*. 
% 
%      H = KAPLAN_MEIER returns the handle to a new KAPLAN_MEIER or 
the handle to 
%      the existing singleton*. 
% 
%      KAPLAN_MEIER('CALLBACK',hObject,eventData,handles,...) calls 
the local 
%      function named CALLBACK in KAPLAN_MEIER.M with the given input 
arguments. 
% 
%      KAPLAN_MEIER('Property','Value',...) creates a new KAPLAN_MEIER 
or raises the 
%      existing singleton*.  Starting from the left, property value 
pairs are 
%      applied to the GUI before kaplan_meier_OpeningFcn gets called.  
An 
%      unrecognized property name or invalid value makes property 
application 
%      stop.  All inputs are passed to kaplan_meier_OpeningFcn via 
varargin. 
% 
%      *See GUI Options on GUIDE's Tools menu.  Choose "GUI allows 
only one 
%      instance to run (singleton)". 
% 
% See also: GUIDE, GUIDATA, GUIHANDLES 
  
% Edit the above text to modify the response to help kaplan_meier 
  
% Last Modified by GUIDE v2.5 27-Jan-2016 17:09:46 
  
% Begin initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
gui_Singleton = 1; 
gui_State = struct('gui_Name',       mfilename, ... 
                   'gui_Singleton',  gui_Singleton, ... 
                   'gui_OpeningFcn', @kaplan_meier_OpeningFcn, ... 
                   'gui_OutputFcn',  @kaplan_meier_OutputFcn, ... 
                   'gui_LayoutFcn',  [] , ... 
                   'gui_Callback',   []); 
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1}) 
    gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1}); 
end 
  
if nargout 
    [varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
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else 
    gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
end 
% End initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
  
  
% --- Executes just before kaplan_meier is made visible. 
function kaplan_meier_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, 
varargin) 
% This function has no output args, see OutputFcn. 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
% varargin   command line arguments to kaplan_meier (see VARARGIN) 
  
% Choose default command line output for kaplan_meier 
handles.output = hObject; 
  
% Update handles structure 
guidata(hObject, handles); 
  
% UIWAIT makes kaplan_meier wait for user response (see UIRESUME) 
% uiwait(handles.figure1); 
  
  
% --- Outputs from this function are returned to the command line. 
function varargout = kaplan_meier_OutputFcn(hObject, eventdata, 
handles)  
% varargout  cell array for returning output args (see VARARGOUT); 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Get default command line output from handles structure 
varargout{1} = handles.output; 
  
  
% --- Executes on button press in pushbutton1. 
function pushbutton1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to pushbutton1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
%ST 
dataQ=get(handles.uitable1, 'data') 
Q = str2double(dataQ) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsQ = all( isnan(Q), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(empty_rowsQ,:) = [] 
empty_columnQ = all( isnan(Q), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
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Q(:,empty_columnQ) = [] 
ST= Q' 
  
%number at risk 
dataX=get(handles.uitable2, 'data') 
X = str2double(dataX) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsX = all( isnan(X), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsX == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsX(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
X(empty_rowsX,:) = [] 
empty_columnX = all( isnan(X), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnX == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnX(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
X(:,empty_columnX) = [] 
NumberAtRisk= X' 
  
%number of failure 
dataP=get(handles.uitable3, 'data') 
P = str2double(dataP) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsP = all( isnan(P), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsP == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsP(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P(empty_rowsP,:) = [] 
empty_columnP = all( isnan(P), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnP == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnP(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P(:,empty_columnP) = [] 
NumberofFailure= P' 
  
E=1-(NumberofFailure./NumberAtRisk) 
cdf=zeros(1,10)'; 
cdf(1)=E(1) %initialize cdf(1)=E 
  
axes(handles.axes1); 
for i=2:9; 
    cdf(i)=E(i)*cdf(i-1) 
    i=i+1 
end 
stairs(ST,cdf) 
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APPENDIX 2  
GUI For Simple Markov Source Code 
 
function varargout = markov_simple_final(varargin) 
% MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL MATLAB code for markov_simple_final.fig 
%      MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL, by itself, creates a new 
MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL or raises the existing 
%      singleton*. 
% 
%      H = MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL returns the handle to a new 
MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL or the handle to 
%      the existing singleton*. 
% 
%      MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL('CALLBACK',hObject,eventData,handles,...) 
calls the local 
%      function named CALLBACK in MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL.M with the given 
input arguments. 
% 
%      MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL('Property','Value',...) creates a new 
MARKOV_SIMPLE_FINAL or raises the 
%      existing singleton*.  Starting from the left, property value 
pairs are 
%      applied to the GUI before markov_simple_final_OpeningFcn gets 
called.  An 
%      unrecognized property name or invalid value makes property 
application 
%      stop.  All inputs are passed to markov_simple_final_OpeningFcn 
via varargin. 
% 
%      *See GUI Options on GUIDE's Tools menu.  Choose "GUI allows 
only one 
%      instance to run (singleton)". 
% 
% See also: GUIDE, GUIDATA, GUIHANDLES 
  
% Edit the above text to modify the response to help 
markov_simple_final 
  
% Last Modified by GUIDE v2.5 25-Jan-2016 20:36:09 
  
% Begin initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
gui_Singleton = 1; 
gui_State = struct('gui_Name',       mfilename, ... 
                   'gui_Singleton',  gui_Singleton, ... 
                   'gui_OpeningFcn', @markov_simple_final_OpeningFcn, 
... 
                   'gui_OutputFcn',  @markov_simple_final_OutputFcn, 
... 
                   'gui_LayoutFcn',  [] , ... 
                   'gui_Callback',   []); 
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1}) 
    gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1}); 
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end 
  
if nargout 
    [varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
else 
    gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
end 
% End initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
  
  
% --- Executes just before markov_simple_final is made visible. 
function markov_simple_final_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, 
varargin) 
% This function has no output args, see OutputFcn. 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
% varargin   command line arguments to markov_simple_final (see 
VARARGIN) 
  
% Choose default command line output for markov_simple_final 
handles.output = hObject; 
  
% Update handles structure 
guidata(hObject, handles); 
  
% UIWAIT makes markov_simple_final wait for user response (see 
UIRESUME) 
% uiwait(handles.figure1); 
  
  
% --- Outputs from this function are returned to the command line. 
function varargout = markov_simple_final_OutputFcn(hObject, eventdata, 
handles)  
% varargout  cell array for returning output args (see VARARGOUT); 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Get default command line output from handles structure 
varargout{1} = handles.output; 
  
  
% --- Executes on button press in pushbutton1. 
function pushbutton1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to pushbutton1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
dataX=get(handles.uitable1, 'data') 
X = str2double(dataX) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsX = all( isnan(X), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsX == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsX(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
X(empty_rowsX,:) = [] 
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empty_columnX = all( isnan(X), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnX == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnX(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
X(:,empty_columnX) = [] 
  
dataP=get(handles.uitable2, 'data') 
P = str2double(dataP) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsP = all( isnan(P), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsP == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsP(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P(empty_rowsP,:) = [] 
  
empty_columnP = all( isnan(P), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnP == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnP(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P(:,empty_columnP) = [] 
  
Xsteady=[P'-
eye(size(P));ones(1,length(P))]\[zeros(length(P),1);1]%Probability of 
state at maximum limit 
After2steps= X*P 
After3steps= After2steps*P 
  
set(handles.uitable3, 'data', Xsteady); 
set(handles.uitable4, 'data', After2steps); 
set(handles.uitable5, 'data', After3steps); 
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APPENDIX 3 
GUI For Markov with Output Graph Source Code 
 
function varargout = MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH(varargin) 
% MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH MATLAB code for MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH.fig 
%      MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH, by itself, creates a new MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH 
or raises the existing 
%      singleton*. 
% 
%      H = MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH returns the handle to a new 
MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH or the handle to 
%      the existing singleton*. 
% 
%      MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH('CALLBACK',hObject,eventData,handles,...) 
calls the local 
%      function named CALLBACK in MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH.M with the given 
input arguments. 
% 
%      MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH('Property','Value',...) creates a new 
MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH or raises the 
%      existing singleton*.  Starting from the left, property value 
pairs are 
%      applied to the GUI before MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH_OpeningFcn gets 
called.  An 
%      unrecognized property name or invalid value makes property 
application 
%      stop.  All inputs are passed to MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH_OpeningFcn 
via varargin. 
% 
%      *See GUI Options on GUIDE's Tools menu.  Choose "GUI allows 
only one 
%      instance to run (singleton)". 
% 
% See also: GUIDE, GUIDATA, GUIHANDLES 
  
% Edit the above text to modify the response to help MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH 
  
% Last Modified by GUIDE v2.5 27-Jan-2016 22:22:02 
  
% Begin initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
gui_Singleton = 1; 
gui_State = struct('gui_Name',       mfilename, ... 
                   'gui_Singleton',  gui_Singleton, ... 
                   'gui_OpeningFcn', @MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH_OpeningFcn, 
... 
                   'gui_OutputFcn',  @MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH_OutputFcn, ... 
                   'gui_LayoutFcn',  [] , ... 
                   'gui_Callback',   []); 
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1}) 
    gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1}); 
end 
  
if nargout 
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    [varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
else 
    gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
end 
% End initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
  
  
% --- Executes just before MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH is made visible. 
function MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, 
varargin) 
% This function has no output args, see OutputFcn. 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
% varargin   command line arguments to MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH (see 
VARARGIN) 
  
% Choose default command line output for MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH 
handles.output = hObject; 
  
% Update handles structure 
guidata(hObject, handles); 
  
% UIWAIT makes MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH wait for user response (see UIRESUME) 
% uiwait(handles.figure1); 
  
  
% --- Outputs from this function are returned to the command line. 
function varargout = MARKOV_WITH_GRAPH_OutputFcn(hObject, eventdata, 
handles)  
% varargout  cell array for returning output args (see VARARGOUT); 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Get default command line output from handles structure 
varargout{1} = handles.output; 
  
  
% --- Executes on selection change in listbox1. 
function listbox1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to listbox1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: contents = cellstr(get(hObject,'String')) returns listbox1 
contents as cell array 
%        contents{get(hObject,'Value')} returns selected item from 
listbox1 
  
dataS=get(handles.uitable1, 'data') 
S = str2double(dataS) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsS = all( isnan(S), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsS == false, 1, 'last') 
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empty_rowsS(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
S(empty_rowsS,:) = [] 
empty_columnS = all( isnan(S), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnS == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnS(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
S(:,empty_columnS) = [] 
  
dataQ=get(handles.uitable2, 'data') 
Q = str2double(dataQ) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsQ = all( isnan(Q), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(empty_rowsQ,:) = [] 
empty_columnQ = all( isnan(Q), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(:,empty_columnQ) = [] 
  
[V D]=eig(Q) 
syms t; 
  
dataP0=get(handles.uitable3, 'data') 
P0 = str2double(dataP0) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsP0 = all( isnan(P0), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsP0 == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsP0(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P0(empty_rowsP0,:) = [] 
empty_columnP0 = all( isnan(P0), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnP0 == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnP0(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P0(:,empty_columnP0) = [] 
  
P=P0*V*expm(D*t)*inv(V); 
Pt=vpa(P) 
N=length(S) 
  
a=get(handles.listbox1, 'Value'); 
if(a==1) 
    axes(handles.axes1); 
    x=1 
    Pt(x) 
    ezplot(Pt(x)); 
    ylabel(['P( ' num2str(S(x)) ')']); 
    xlabel('Time') 
    title('Probabilities of being in states 0'); 
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elseif(a==2) 
    axes(handles.axes1); 
    x=2 
    Pt(x) 
    ezplot(Pt(x)); 
    ylabel(['P( ' num2str(S(x)) ')']); 
    xlabel('Time') 
    title('Probabilities of being in states 1'); 
elseif(a==3) 
    axes(handles.axes1); 
    x=3 
    Pt(x) 
    ezplot(Pt(x)); 
    ylabel(['P( ' num2str(S(x)) ')']); 
    xlabel('Time') 
    title('Probabilities of being in states 2') 
elseif(a==4) 
    axes(handles.axes1); 
    x=4 
    Pt(x) 
    ezplot(Pt(x)); 
    ylabel(['P( ' num2str(S(x)) ')']); 
    xlabel('Time') 
    title('Probabilities of being in states 3'); 
elseif(a==5) 
    axes(handles.axes1); 
    x=5 
    Pt(x) 
    ezplot(Pt(x)); 
    ylabel(['P( ' num2str(S(x)) ')']); 
    xlabel('Time') 
    title('Probabilities of being in states 4'); 
elseif(a==6) 
    axes(handles.axes1); 
    x=6 
    Pt(x) 
    ezplot(Pt(x)); 
    ylabel(['P( ' num2str(S(x)) ')']); 
    xlabel('Time') 
    title('Probabilities of being in states 5'); 
elseif(a==7) 
    axes(handles.axes1); 
    x=7 
    Pt(x) 
    ezplot(Pt(x)); 
    ylabel(['P( ' num2str(S(x)) ')']); 
    xlabel('Time') 
    title('Probabilities of being in states 6'); 
end 
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function listbox1_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to listbox1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: listbox controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
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%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
 172 
APPENDIX 4 
GUI For Mean Time to Failure Source Code 
 
function varargout = MTTF(varargin) 
% MTTF MATLAB code for MTTF.fig 
%      MTTF, by itself, creates a new MTTF or raises the existing 
%      singleton*. 
% 
%      H = MTTF returns the handle to a new MTTF or the handle to 
%      the existing singleton*. 
% 
%      MTTF('CALLBACK',hObject,eventData,handles,...) calls the local 
%      function named CALLBACK in MTTF.M with the given input 
arguments. 
% 
%      MTTF('Property','Value',...) creates a new MTTF or raises the 
%      existing singleton*.  Starting from the left, property value 
pairs are 
%      applied to the GUI before MTTF_OpeningFcn gets called.  An 
%      unrecognized property name or invalid value makes property 
application 
%      stop.  All inputs are passed to MTTF_OpeningFcn via varargin. 
% 
%      *See GUI Options on GUIDE's Tools menu.  Choose "GUI allows 
only one 
%      instance to run (singleton)". 
% 
% See also: GUIDE, GUIDATA, GUIHANDLES 
  
% Edit the above text to modify the response to help MTTF 
  
% Last Modified by GUIDE v2.5 27-Jan-2016 17:39:12 
  
% Begin initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
gui_Singleton = 1; 
gui_State = struct('gui_Name',       mfilename, ... 
                   'gui_Singleton',  gui_Singleton, ... 
                   'gui_OpeningFcn', @MTTF_OpeningFcn, ... 
                   'gui_OutputFcn',  @MTTF_OutputFcn, ... 
                   'gui_LayoutFcn',  [] , ... 
                   'gui_Callback',   []); 
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1}) 
    gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1}); 
end 
  
if nargout 
    [varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
else 
    gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
end 
% End initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
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% --- Executes just before MTTF is made visible. 
function MTTF_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, varargin) 
% This function has no output args, see OutputFcn. 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
% varargin   command line arguments to MTTF (see VARARGIN) 
  
% Choose default command line output for MTTF 
handles.output = hObject; 
  
% Update handles structure 
guidata(hObject, handles); 
  
% UIWAIT makes MTTF wait for user response (see UIRESUME) 
% uiwait(handles.figure1); 
  
  
% --- Outputs from this function are returned to the command line. 
function varargout = MTTF_OutputFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)  
% varargout  cell array for returning output args (see VARARGOUT); 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Get default command line output from handles structure 
varargout{1} = handles.output; 
  
  
% --- Executes on button press in pushbutton1. 
function pushbutton1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to pushbutton1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
dataQ=get(handles.uitable1, 'data') 
Q = str2double(dataQ) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsQ = all( isnan(Q), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(empty_rowsQ,:) = [] 
empty_columnQ = all( isnan(Q), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(:,empty_columnQ) = [] 
  
dataP0=get(handles.uitable2, 'data') 
P0 = str2double(dataP0) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsP0 = all( isnan(P0), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsP0 == false, 1, 'last') 
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empty_rowsP0(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P0(empty_rowsP0,:) = [] 
empty_columnP0 = all( isnan(P0), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnP0 == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnP0(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
P0(:,empty_columnP0) = [] 
  
syms t; 
[V D]=eig(Q); 
P=P0*V*expm(D*t)*inv(V); 
Pt=vpa(P) 
F = int(Pt(1),t,0,Inf) 
mttf=single(F) 
set(handles.result,'String',mttf) 
  
function result_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to result (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of result as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of result 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function result_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to result (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
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APPENDIX 5 
GUI for Constant Pressure Source Code 
 
function varargout = CONSTANT_PRESSURE(varargin) 
% CONSTANT_PRESSURE MATLAB code for CONSTANT_PRESSURE.fig 
%      CONSTANT_PRESSURE, by itself, creates a new CONSTANT_PRESSURE 
or raises the existing 
%      singleton*. 
% 
%      H = CONSTANT_PRESSURE returns the handle to a new 
CONSTANT_PRESSURE or the handle to 
%      the existing singleton*. 
% 
%      CONSTANT_PRESSURE('CALLBACK',hObject,eventData,handles,...) 
calls the local 
%      function named CALLBACK in CONSTANT_PRESSURE.M with the given 
input arguments. 
% 
%      CONSTANT_PRESSURE('Property','Value',...) creates a new 
CONSTANT_PRESSURE or raises the 
%      existing singleton*.  Starting from the left, property value 
pairs are 
%      applied to the GUI before CONSTANT_PRESSURE_OpeningFcn gets 
called.  An 
%      unrecognized property name or invalid value makes property 
application 
%      stop.  All inputs are passed to CONSTANT_PRESSURE_OpeningFcn 
via varargin. 
% 
%      *See GUI Options on GUIDE's Tools menu.  Choose "GUI allows 
only one 
%      instance to run (singleton)". 
% 
% See also: GUIDE, GUIDATA, GUIHANDLES 
  
% Edit the above text to modify the response to help CONSTANT_PRESSURE 
  
% Last Modified by GUIDE v2.5 27-Jan-2016 23:36:12 
  
% Begin initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
gui_Singleton = 1; 
gui_State = struct('gui_Name',       mfilename, ... 
                   'gui_Singleton',  gui_Singleton, ... 
                   'gui_OpeningFcn', @CONSTANT_PRESSURE_OpeningFcn, 
... 
                   'gui_OutputFcn',  @CONSTANT_PRESSURE_OutputFcn, ... 
                   'gui_LayoutFcn',  [] , ... 
                   'gui_Callback',   []); 
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1}) 
    gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1}); 
end 
  
if nargout 
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    [varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
else 
    gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
end 
% End initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
  
  
% --- Executes just before CONSTANT_PRESSURE is made visible. 
function CONSTANT_PRESSURE_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, 
varargin) 
% This function has no output args, see OutputFcn. 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
% varargin   command line arguments to CONSTANT_PRESSURE (see 
VARARGIN) 
  
% Choose default command line output for CONSTANT_PRESSURE 
handles.output = hObject; 
  
% Update handles structure 
guidata(hObject, handles); 
  
% UIWAIT makes CONSTANT_PRESSURE wait for user response (see UIRESUME) 
% uiwait(handles.figure1); 
  
  
% --- Outputs from this function are returned to the command line. 
function varargout = CONSTANT_PRESSURE_OutputFcn(hObject, eventdata, 
handles)  
% varargout  cell array for returning output args (see VARARGOUT); 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Get default command line output from handles structure 
varargout{1} = handles.output; 
  
  
% --- Executes on button press in pushbutton1. 
function pushbutton1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to pushbutton1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
dataQ=get(handles.uitable1, 'data') 
Q = str2double(dataQ) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsQ = all( isnan(Q), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(empty_rowsQ,:) = [] 
empty_columnQ = all( isnan(Q), 1 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
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%remove them 
Q(:,empty_columnQ) = [] 
%select column 
xdatatemp = Q(:,[1]) 
xdatatemp2 = Q(:,[2]) 
  
[b, log1, H, stats]=coxphfit(xdatatemp2,xdatatemp) 
hazardRatio=char(vpa(exp(b),4)) 
set(handles.edit1,'String',num2str(stats.covb,4)) 
set(handles.edit2,'String',num2str(stats.beta,4)) 
set(handles.edit3,'String',num2str(stats.se,4)) 
set(handles.edit4,'String',num2str(stats.z,4)) 
set(handles.edit5,'String',num2str(stats.p,4)) 
set(handles.edit6,'String',hazardRatio) 
  
  
function edit1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit1 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit1 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit1_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit2_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit2 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit2 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit2 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit2_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit2 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
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% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit3_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit3 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit3 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit3 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit3_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit3 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit4_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit6 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit6 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit6 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit4_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit6 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
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%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit6_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit6 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit6 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit6 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit6_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit6 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
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APPENDIX 6 
GUI for Constant Temperature Source Code 
 
function varargout = CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE(varargin) 
% CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE MATLAB code for CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE.fig 
%      CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE, by itself, creates a new 
CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE or raises the existing 
%      singleton*. 
% 
%      H = CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE returns the handle to a new 
CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE or the handle to 
%      the existing singleton*. 
% 
%      CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE('CALLBACK',hObject,eventData,handles,...) 
calls the local 
%      function named CALLBACK in CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE.M with the 
given input arguments. 
% 
%      CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE('Property','Value',...) creates a new 
CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE or raises the 
%      existing singleton*.  Starting from the left, property value 
pairs are 
%      applied to the GUI before CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE_OpeningFcn gets 
called.  An 
%      unrecognized property name or invalid value makes property 
application 
%      stop.  All inputs are passed to CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE_OpeningFcn 
via varargin. 
% 
%      *See GUI Options on GUIDE's Tools menu.  Choose "GUI allows 
only one 
%      instance to run (singleton)". 
% 
% See also: GUIDE, GUIDATA, GUIHANDLES 
  
% Edit the above text to modify the response to help 
CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE 
  
% Last Modified by GUIDE v2.5 27-Jan-2016 23:31:17 
  
% Begin initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
gui_Singleton = 1; 
gui_State = struct('gui_Name',       mfilename, ... 
                   'gui_Singleton',  gui_Singleton, ... 
                   'gui_OpeningFcn', @CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE_OpeningFcn, 
... 
                   'gui_OutputFcn',  @CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE_OutputFcn, 
... 
                   'gui_LayoutFcn',  [] , ... 
                   'gui_Callback',   []); 
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1}) 
    gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1}); 
end 
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if nargout 
    [varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
else 
    gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:}); 
end 
% End initialization code - DO NOT EDIT 
  
  
% --- Executes just before CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE is made visible. 
function CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, 
varargin) 
% This function has no output args, see OutputFcn. 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
% varargin   command line arguments to CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE (see 
VARARGIN) 
  
% Choose default command line output for CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE 
handles.output = hObject; 
  
% Update handles structure 
guidata(hObject, handles); 
  
% UIWAIT makes CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE wait for user response (see 
UIRESUME) 
% uiwait(handles.figure1); 
  
  
% --- Outputs from this function are returned to the command line. 
function varargout = CONSTANT_TEMPERATURE_OutputFcn(hObject, 
eventdata, handles)  
% varargout  cell array for returning output args (see VARARGOUT); 
% hObject    handle to figure 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Get default command line output from handles structure 
varargout{1} = handles.output; 
  
  
% --- Executes on button press in pushbutton1. 
function pushbutton1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to pushbutton1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
dataQ=get(handles.uitable1, 'data') 
Q = str2double(dataQ) 
%detect empty rows 
empty_rowsQ = all( isnan(Q), 2 ) 
%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_rowsQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_rowsQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(empty_rowsQ,:) = [] 
empty_columnQ = all( isnan(Q), 1 ) 
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%but we only want to strip trailing empty rows 
last_nonempty = find(empty_columnQ == false, 1, 'last') 
empty_columnQ(1:last_nonempty) = false 
%remove them 
Q(:,empty_columnQ) = [] 
%select column 
xdatatemp = Q(:,[1]) 
xdatatemp2 = Q(:,[2]) 
  
[b, log1, H, stats]=coxphfit(xdatatemp2,xdatatemp) 
hazardRatio=char(vpa(exp(b),4)) 
set(handles.edit1,'String',num2str(stats.covb,4)) 
set(handles.edit2,'String',num2str(stats.beta,4)) 
set(handles.edit3,'String',num2str(stats.se,4)) 
set(handles.edit4,'String',num2str(stats.z,4)) 
set(handles.edit5,'String',num2str(stats.p,4)) 
set(handles.edit6,'String',hazardRatio) 
  
  
function edit1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit1 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit1 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit1_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit1 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit2_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit2 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit2 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit2 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
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function edit2_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit2 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit3_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit3 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit3 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit3 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit3_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit3 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit4_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit4 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit4 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit4 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit4_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit4 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
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% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
  
  
  
function edit6_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit6 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    structure with handles and user data (see GUIDATA) 
  
% Hints: get(hObject,'String') returns contents of edit6 as text 
%        str2double(get(hObject,'String')) returns contents of edit6 
as a double 
  
  
% --- Executes during object creation, after setting all properties. 
function edit6_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles) 
% hObject    handle to edit6 (see GCBO) 
% eventdata  reserved - to be defined in a future version of MATLAB 
% handles    empty - handles not created until after all CreateFcns 
called 
  
% Hint: edit controls usually have a white background on Windows. 
%       See ISPC and COMPUTER. 
if ispc && isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), 
get(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor')) 
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor','white'); 
end 
 
